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“Detention” under the Charter after
R. v. Grant and R. v. Suberu
Steven Penney* and James Stribopoulos**

I. INTRODUCTION
In R. v. Grant1 and R. v. Suberu,2 the Supreme Court of Canada revisited the relationship between police detention powers and the Charter.3 In
Grant it updated the test for deciding whether a “detention” has arisen
for Charter purposes. This question is critical for two reasons: first, “detention” is the trigger for the constitutional guarantee forbidding arbitrary
detention (section 94); and second, it is one of the two triggers (the other
being “arrest”) of the right to be informed of the reasons for detention
(section 10(a)) and the right to counsel (section 10(b)).5 In Suberu the
Court held (in contrast to some lower courts) that absent exigent safety
concerns, the section 10(b) caution must be given immediately to persons
subject to the common law power of investigative detention.
Grant and Suberu have their doctrinal virtues. Grant’s multi-factor
approach for assessing whether or not there has been a psychological
detention is flexible and nuanced. It fails, however, to give police sufficient guidance on the scope of their authority. In our view, this
uncertainty is likely to have three unfortunate effects. First, it will cause
too many errors, that is, cases where police incorrectly decide (in relation
to what the courts will or would have found) that a detention has or has
not arisen. Second, in the face of this uncertainty, police will more often
than not assume that a detention has not occurred and (and when they are
*

Faculty of Law, University of Alberta.
Osgoode Hall Law School York University.
[2009] S.C.J. No. 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grant”].
2
[2009] S.C.J. No. 33, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Suberu”].
3
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
4
Section 9 of the Charter states: “Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or
imprisoned.”
5
Section 10(a) and (b) of the Charter states: “Everyone has the right on arrest or detention
(a) to be informed promptly of the reasons therefor; [and] (b) to retain and instruct counsel without
delay and to be informed of that right ...”.
**
1
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wrong) thereby deprive those detained of their rights under sections 9
and 10 of the Charter. Finally, in applying Grant, lower courts will too
often take an overly deferential approach toward police decision-making.
Suberu’s virtue, in contrast, is its simplicity: police now know that
they must issue the section 10(b) caution immediately upon any type of
detention, including investigative detention. Of course, if it is often uncertain whether a detention has arisen, the benefit of this simplicity will
be muted. More troubling, the Court’s failure to carve out an exception to
the section 10(b) caution requirement for investigative detention will
likely have three perverse effects: increasing the length and intrusiveness
of detentions, diminishing law enforcement safety and effectiveness, and
causing courts to avoid finding that a detention has arisen despite substantial intrusions on individual liberty.
In what follows we first review the jurisprudential history leading to
Grant’s holding on detention. Next we consider this holding and its application to the facts in Grant and Suberu. We then outline our thesis
regarding Grant’s flaws and suggest how the approach to deciding
whether there has been a psychological “detention” should be further
reformed. Last, we trace the history of the relationship between the
common law power to detain for investigative purposes and section 10 of
the Charter, and flesh out the case for justifying an override of section
10(b) during such detentions.

II. THE MEANING OF DETENTION UNDER THE CHARTER
1. History and Context
Absent detention, police enjoy considerable freedom in questioning
suspects.6 Questioning may produce evidence of wrongdoing, because
the answers are either incriminating or reveal the location of physical
evidence. If the detention threshold is crossed, however, the constitutional implications are significant. First, if police lack the requisite legal
grounds to detain,7 section 9 of the Charter is violated.8 Second, as
6
Other than the Charter, the only significant restraint on police questioning of adult suspects stems from the common law voluntary confessions rule. See generally R. v. Oickle, [2000]
S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
7
In order to lawfully detain, a police officer must have reasonable grounds to suspect a
clear nexus between the individual to be detained and a recently committing or still unfolding criminal offence. See R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at paras. 34, 45 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Mann”].
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mentioned, detention also triggers informational duties under section 10
of the Charter. This information may alert suspects to the potential jeopardy faced and cause them to stop talking. As a result, until they are
ready to effect an arrest, the police will often want to avoid a detention.9
It is the courts, however, not the police, who ultimately decide whether
and when the detention threshold was crossed in a given case.
It was a case involving section 10(b), the right to counsel, which first
raised the meaning of detention before the Supreme Court. In R. v. Therens,10 police subjected a motorist to a breath demand under the Criminal
Code.11 He was taken back to the police station, took and failed a
breathalyzer test, and was arrested. At the time of the demand, police did
not apprise him of his right to counsel, which section 10(b) requires on
“detention”.
The issue before the Court in Therens was whether the motorist was
“detained” following the breath demand but before his arrest. The Court

8
The Court in Grant sensibly recognized that any unlawful interference with an individual’s
liberty is necessarily arbitrary and violates s. 9 of the Charter. Earlier lower court decisions holding
otherwise, the Court confirmed, should no longer be followed. See Grant, supra, note 1, at paras. 54-55.
The Court specifically cited R. v. Duguay, [1985] O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), which
held that not every unlawful detention is necessarily arbitrary and suggested a need to consider the
detaining officer’s mindset. For example, an oblique motive would result in finding an arbitrary detention but an honest mistake based on grounds just short of those required by the law might not. Id., at
296. Prior to Grant, the Duguay approach had been widely followed. See R. v. Brown, [1987] N.S.J.
No. 22, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 54, at 67-68 (N.S.C.A.); Freeman v. West Vancouver (District), [1992] B.C.J.
No. 2146, 19 B.C.A.C. 81, at para. 29 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Campbell, [2003] M.J. No. 207, 175 C.C.C.
(3d) 452, at paras. 39-42 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Perello, [2005] S.J. No. 60, 193 C.C.C. (3d) 151, at para. 40
(Sask. C.A.); R. v. Pimental, [2000] M.J. No. 256, 145 Man. R. (2d) 295 (Man. C.A.), leave to appeal
refused [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 359 (S.C.C.). But see R. v. Iron, [1987] S.J. No. 49, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 157
(Sask. C.A.) (detention necessarily arbitrary if not authorized by either statute or common law); R. v.
Simpson, [1994] N.J. No. 69, 88 C.C.C. (3d) 377, at 388 (Nfld. C.A.), revd in the result only [1995]
S.C.J. No. 12, 95 C.C.C. (3d) 96 (S.C.C.) (implicitly questioning Duguay approach but without referring to it). The Duguay approach had also been criticized by commentators. See Don Stuart, Charter
Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 3d ed. (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 2001), at 263 [hereinafter
“Stuart”]; James Stribopoulos, “The Forgotten Right: Section 9 of the Charter, Its Purpose and Meaning” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 211, at 218-31 [hereinafter “Stribopoulos, ‘The Forgotten Right’”].
9
See Casey Hill, “Investigative Detention: A Search / Seizure by Any Other Name?”
(2008) 40 S.C.LR. (2d) 179 [hereinafter “Hill”], who notes that there is
a situational incentive for the police to provide the suspect less, rather than more, information about the transaction under investigation as the investigator’s questions attempt to
draw out information about the suspect’s recent whereabouts, association with others,
route, etc., committing the detainee to an account for evaluation against the officer’s possessed and incoming information.
Id., at 204.
10
[1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Therens”].
11
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 235(1). Today, see Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as amended,
s. 254(3).
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had previously held12 that breath demands do not trigger a detention under section 2(c)(ii) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, which provides the
“right to retain and instruct counsel without delay” to persons “arrested
or detained”.13 The fact that it is an offence to refuse to comply did not
mean that a person subject to such a demand was legally detained.14 Detention, under the Canadian Bill of Rights, was limited to situations of
“actual physical restraint”.15
In Therens, Le Dain J. concluded that the meaning of detention under
the Canadian Bill of Rights was not controlling under the Charter.
Rather, he reasoned that detention under the Charter should be read more
broadly.16 In addition to physical constraint, he asserted, a detention also
arises when police assume “control over the movement of a person by a
demand or direction which may have significant legal consequence and
which prevents or impedes access to counsel”.17 Given the legal duty on
the motorist to accompany the police officer for the purposes of administering a breath test, this would have been enough to dispose of the
appeal. But Le Dain J. went a step further, holding that a detention may
sometimes arise even when there is neither physical restraint nor “criminal liability for failure to comply” with a legal duty.18 He explained:

12

R. v. Chromiak, [1979] S.C.J. No. 116, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 471 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Chromiak”].
13
Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, s. 2(c)(ii) (emphasis added).
14
Chromiak, supra, note 12, at 478.
15
Id.
16
In so concluding, he emphasized “that the Charter must be regarded, because of its constitutional character, as a new affirmation of rights and freedoms and of judicial power and
responsibility in relation to their protection”. Therens, supra, note 10, at 638, Le Dain J. dissenting
(on other grounds). He also went on to explain two further reasons for rejecting the narrow definition
from Chromiak. First, he acknowledged that the judiciary had felt rather restrained in its use of the
Canadian Bill of Rights given that it was simply legislation and therefore lacked constitutional
status. Id. In addition, given that the Canadian Bill of Rights did not include any equivalent to s. 1 of
the Charter, a narrow interpretation of “detention” was the only means by which the Court in
Chromiak could place reasonable limits on the right to counsel. Id., at 639. Of course, s. 1 of the
Charter now permits the Supreme Court to balance individual and state interests more transparently.
17
Therens, id., at 642, Le Dain J., dissenting (on other grounds). All eight judges in Therens
agreed that the accused was detained, however only three others expressly adopted Le Dain J.’s
reasoning. A unanimous Court subsequently endorsed Le Dain J.’s approach. See R. v. Thomsen,
[1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 649 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Thomsen”]. Therens’ approach to defining detention has since been repeatedly affirmed by the Court. See R. v. Simmons,
[1988] S.C.J. No. 86, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495 (S.C.C.); R. v. Feeney, [1997] S.C.J. No. 49, [1997] 2
S.C.R. 13, at 55 (S.C.C.); R. v. Prosper, [1994] S.C.J. No. 72, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236, at 272-73
(S.C.C.); Dehghani v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] S.C.J. No. 38,
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 1053, at 1065-66 (S.C.C.).
18
Therens, id., at 644.
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In my opinion, it is not realistic, as a general rule, to regard compliance
with a demand or direction by a police officer as truly voluntary, in the
sense that the citizen feels that he or she has the choice to obey or not.
… Most citizens are not aware of the precise legal limits of police
authority. Rather than risk the application of physical force or
prosecution for wilful obstruction, the reasonable person is likely to err
on the side of caution, assume lawful authority and comply with the
demand. The element of psychological compulsion, in the form of a
reasonable perception of suspension of freedom of choice, is enough to
make the restraint of liberty involuntary. Detention may be effected
without the application or threat of application of physical restraint if
the person concerned submits or acquiesces in the deprivation of liberty
and reasonably believes that the choice to do otherwise does not exist.19

Not long after Therens was decided, its definition of “detention” for
section 10 Charter purposes was transplanted to section 9. The Supreme
Court concluded that there is “no reason in principle why the general
approach to the meaning of detention reflected in those cases should not
be applied to the meaning of ‘detained’ in s. 9”.20
Therens thus had the effect of recognizing three categories of detention, now pertinent for both sections 9 and 10 of the Charter: (i)
psychological restraint (with legal compulsion); (ii) psychological restraint (without legal compulsion); and (iii) physical restraint.21
The second of these categories — the one addressed in Grant — has
proved to be the trickiest. On its face, the test is paradoxical: it deems people to be “detained” for Charter purposes even though their liberty is not
limited by law. Despite their (reasonable) belief that they must comply
with police requests, they actually have no legal obligation to do so. (We
thus sometimes refer to this category as “non-legal” psychological detention.) As the Court explained in Grant, “an individual confronted by state
authority ordinarily has the option to choose simply to walk away”.22
How has this situation arisen? We can imagine a legal regime requiring police to tell people whether they are legally obliged to cooperate.
Before stopping and questioning, for example, police would have to tell
19
Id. This is in keeping with the Supreme Court’s eventual recognition in Grant that the
purpose of s. 9 is both to protect “physical liberty” as well as “mental liberty”. See Grant, supra,
note 1, at para. 20.
20
R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621, at 632 (S.C.C.). See also R. v.
Ladouceur, [1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257, at 1277 (S.C.C.).
21
See Therens, supra, note 10, at 641-44, Le Dain J., dissenting; Thomsen, supra, note 17,
at 648-49. In Grant the Court specifically reaffirmed these three categories of detention first recognized in Therens. See Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 30.
22
Grant, id., at para. 21.
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suspects that they are either: (i) being detained under law for a particular
purpose (with an explanation as to what they are legally required to do
and what they are free to refuse to do); or (ii) not being detained and free
to leave or remain silent.23
Neither Parliament nor the courts, however, have seen fit to impose
such a regime.24 Instead, they have sanctioned a state of affairs in which
police are permitted (as a general rule) to approach people and ask them
questions without any particularized suspicion and without any need to
inform them of their legal status or rights. As the Supreme Court explained in Grant:
Section 9 of the Charter does not require that police abstain from
interacting with members of the public until they have specific grounds
to connect the individual to the commission of a crime. Nor does s. 10
require that the police advise everyone at the outset of any encounter that
they have no obligation to speak to them and are entitled to legal
counsel.25

Given this legal milieu, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court of
Canada has recognized that people often assume that they must comply
with police requests.26 Nor is it surprising, given the imbalance of power
and potential for abuse inherent in such encounters, that the Court has
found that a “detention” may occur for Charter purposes even in circumstances where an individual has no legal obligation to remain in the
company of police and would be legally justified in simply walking away.
When it comes to psychological detention, the challenge is demarcating the line between consensual and coerced encounters. This is no easy
task. Encounters between individuals and the police are rich in their diversity. Most such experiences are relatively benign, usually involving
nothing more than conversation.27 Such exchanges can become more in23
See Law Reform Commission of Canada, Arrest (Report 29) (Ottawa: The Commission,
1986), at 20; Stephen Coughlan, “Police Detention for Questioning: A Proposal” (1986) 28 Crim.
L.Q. 170; Alan D. Gold, “Perspectives on Section 10(b): The Right to Counsel under the Charter”
(1993) 22 C.R. (4th) 370, at 374 [hereinafter “Gold”].
24
The Grant Court did counsel police that if they are “uncertain whether their conduct is
having a coercive effect on the individual, it is open to them to inform the subject in unambiguous
terms that he or she is under no obligation to answer questions and is free to go”. Grant, supra, note
1, at para. 32.
25
Grant, id., at para. 38. See also Suberu, supra, note 2, at para. 3.
26
Therens, supra, note 10.
27
See Mann, supra, note 7, at para. 19 (“the law has not yet reached a point that a compulsion to comply will be inferred whenever a police officer requests information, for that would mean
police could never ask questions”). See also R. v. Grafe, [1987] O.J. No. 796, 60 C.R. (3d) 242 (Ont.
C.A.); United States of America v. Alfaro, [1992] J.Q. no 831, 75 C.C.C. (3d) 211, at 236 (Que.
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vasive, however, as consent and conversation shade over to coercion and
interrogation. As noted, for non-legal psychological detention, the turning point is the moment when the suspect submits to police authority and
reasonably believes that the choice to do otherwise does not exist.28
Unfortunately, Therens failed to provide any concrete guidance to assist lower courts in distinguishing consensual from coerced encounters.
Without it, lower courts, almost invariably seeing only cases involving
factually guilty claimants,29 have sometimes refrained from labelling
ambiguously coercive encounters as detentions.30
2. The Grant Standard for Psychological Detention without Legal
Compulsion
In Grant, the Supreme Court of Canada expressly reaffirmed Therens’ definition of detention, including the category of psychological
restraint without legal compulsion.31 Under Grant, the ultimate question
remains “whether the police conduct would cause a reasonable person to
conclude that he or she was not free to go and had to comply with the
police direction or demand”.32 But recognizing that this form of detention
had “proven difficult to define consistently”,33 the Court added a considerable measure of gloss. In so doing, however, it subtly narrowed the
definition’s scope. Emphasizing a point absent from Therens, the Court
stated that “not every trivial or insignificant interference with liberty attracts Charter scrutiny”; rather, only the person “whose liberty is
meaningfully constrained has genuine need of the additional rights accorded by the Charter to people in that situation”.34 The coupling of
C.A.); R. v. Elshaw, [1991] S.C.J. No. 68, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 24, at 53-70 (S.C.C.), L’Heureux-Dubé J.,
dissenting.
28
Therens, supra, note 10, at 644.
29
See Stribopoulos, “The Forgotten Right”, supra, note 8, at 237-39 (discussing selection
bias ensuing from the fact that courts are presented only with encounters where evidence is obtained,
placing pressure to uphold police actions to ensure conviction of the factually guilty).
30
Id., at 239-45 (discussing this trend, especially in the Ontario Court of Appeal). See e.g.,
R. v. Lawrence, [1990] O.J. No. 1648, 59 C.C.C. (3d) 55 (Ont. C.A.), where a police officer, investigating a reported break-in, drove his police cruiser onto the sidewalk to block Ms. Lawrence from
proceeding further on her bicycle. She was questioned for 25 minutes regarding where she lived. The
officer disbelieved her and asked to look in her backpack; she complied, revealing evidence that
implicated her in a break-in. She was then placed in the rear of the cruiser. The Court found that she
was only detained after being placed in the police cruiser.
31
Grant, supra, note 1, at paras. 28-32.
32
Id., at para. 31.
33
Id.
34
Id., at para. 26 (emphasis added). The Court quoted here with approval from Mann, supra, note 7, where Iacobucci J. noted (at para. 26) that
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“detention” with “imprisonment” in section 9, the Court explained, suggests that detention arises “when the deprivation of liberty may have
legal consequences”.35
The Court in Grant also stressed that the Therens test is objective,
meaning that a police officer’s subjective intentions are not relevant in
deciding if there was a detention.36 The suspect’s “particular circumstances and perceptions,” however, may be relevant “in assessing the
reasonableness of any perceived power imbalance between the individual
and the police, and thus the reasonableness of any perception that he or
she had no choice but to comply with the police directive”.37 The claimant’s testimony will usually be the best source of such evidence, the
Court noted; but since the test is objective a claimant’s failure to testify is
not fatal to finding a detention.38
With this backdrop in place, the Court proceeded to identify a host of
factors to consider when deciding whether a non-legal psychological detention occurred. First, it emphasized the importance of determining the
police’s purpose in approaching or questioning the claimant. If this purpose was non-adversarial, a finding of detention is unlikely. For example,
the Court stated that no detention would arise where police respond to an
emergency call, even if they assume control over the situation or interfere with a person’s freedom of movement.39 Similarly, there is no
detention when police approach bystanders in the wake of an accident or
crime to obtain preliminary information for their investigation.40 Deprivations of liberty that result from such encounters are not “significant
enough to attract Charter scrutiny because they do not attract legal consequences for the concerned individuals”.41
According to the Court, neighbourhood policing initiatives (where
police focus on meeting community needs and maintaining order) fall in
... the police cannot be said to “detain”, within the meaning of ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter,
every suspect they stop for purposes of identification, or even interview. The person who
is stopped will in all cases be “detained” in the sense of “delayed”, or “kept waiting.” But
the constitutional rights recognized by ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter are not engaged by delays that involve no significant physical or psychological restraint.
35
Grant, id., at para. 29.
36
Id., at para. 32. The majority acknowledged that the officer’s subjective intentions will be
relevant in deciding upon the appropriate remedy under s. 24(2) of the Charter if a violation is made
out. Id. In contrast, Binnie J. emphasized the importance of considering the subjective mindset of the
police in deciding whether or not a detention has taken place. See Grant, id., Binnie J., concurring.
37
Id., at para. 32.
38
Id., at para. 50.
39
Id., para. 36.
40
Id., at para. 37.
41
Id., at para. 36.
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the non-adversarial category. It rightly acknowledged, however, that this
sort of proactive policing can “subtly merge with the potentially coercive
police role of investigating crime and arresting suspects so that they may
be brought to justice”.42
The Court contrasted these kinds of non-adversarial encounters with
situations where police have a “[f]ocussed suspicion”.43 While focused
suspicion does not in itself give rise to a detention, “police must be mindful that, depending on how they act and what they say, the point may be
reached where a reasonable person, in the position of that individual,
would conclude he or she is not free to choose to walk away or decline to
answer questions”.44
The second factor the Court identified was the duration of the encounter.45 The shorter the interaction, the less likely it is to be labelled a
detention. The longer the encounter, in contrast, the more likely a reasonable person would feel unable to walk away.
Third, the Court noted that physical contact between the police officer and the individual affected is a relevant consideration. But as with
other variables, its significance hinges on context. The Court gave the
example of a police officer “placing” his or her hand on someone’s arm:
If sustained, it might well lead a reasonable person to conclude that his
or her freedom to choose whether to cooperate or not has been
removed. On the other hand, a fleeting touch may not, depending on the
circumstances, give rise to a reasonable conclusion that one’s liberty
has been curtailed.46

Finally, the Court recognized that in some situations, “a single forceful act or word may be enough to cause a reasonable person to conclude
that his or her right to choose how to respond has been removed”.47 No
42

Id., at para. 40. This observation by the Court reveals a perceptive appreciation of some
of the realities of community policing. See Stephen M. Mastrofski, “Community Policing As Reform: A Cautionary Tale” [hereinafter “Mastrofski”] in Jack R. Green & Stephen D. Mastrofski,
eds., Community Policing: Rhetoric Or Reality (New York: Praeger, 1988) 46, at 53 (noting that
“aggressive order maintenance strategies” are often part and parcel of community policing efforts
and can include “rousting and arresting people thought to cause public disorder, field interrogations
and roadblock checks, surveillance of suspicious people, vigorous enforcement of public order and
nuisance laws, and, in general, much greater attention to the minor crimes and disturbances thought
to disrupt and displease the civil public”).
43
Grant, id., at para. 41
44
Id.
45
Id., at para. 42.
46
Id. As we discuss infra, note 145, anything more than a fleeting touch would likely result
in detention by means of physical restraint.
47
Id.
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reasonable person, for example, would feel free to walk away after a police officer points at him or her and issues an authoritative command to
“get out of your car”!48
In conclusion, the Court in Grant set out the following useful summary:
… In cases where there is no physical restraint or legal obligation, it
may not be clear whether a person has been detained. To determine
whether the reasonable person in the individual’s circumstances would
conclude that he or she had been deprived by the state of the liberty of
choice, the court may consider, inter alia, the following factors:
(a) The circumstances giving rise to the encounter as would
reasonably be perceived by the individual: whether the police were
providing general assistance; maintaining general order; making
general inquiries regarding a particular occurrence; or, singling out
the individual for focused investigation.
(b) The nature of the police conduct, including the language used; the
use of physical contact; the place where the interaction occurred;
the presence of others; and the duration of the encounter.
(c) The particular characteristics or circumstances of the individual
where relevant, including age; physical stature; minority status;
level of sophistication.49

In considering these factors, trial judges must keep in mind “all the
circumstances of the case”50 and engage in “a realistic appraisal of the
entire interaction as it developed, not a minute parsing of words and
movements”.51 But while the trial judge’s findings of fact are owed deference on appeal, the “application of the law to the facts is a question of
law”.52 Given the number of factors that a trial judge must take into account, the potential for reviewable error seems considerable.
3. Applying the Grant Factors in R. v. Grant and R. v. Suberu
Applying the factors discussed above, the Supreme Court concluded
that there was a detention in Grant. Mr. Grant, a young black man, was
48
See, e.g., R. v. Chaisson, [2006] S.C.J. No. 11, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 415 (S.C.C.) (restoring
trial judge’s finding that detention arose when accused complied with police direction to “get out” of
his parked car).
49
Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 44.
50
Id., at para. 43.
51
Id., at para. 32.
52
Id., at para. 43. See also id., at para. 32.
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walking on the sidewalk of a Toronto street at midday when, according to
two plainclothes police officers, his manner and clothing attracted their
attention. The plainclothes officers requested that a nearby uniformed
officer “have a chat” with Mr. Grant. The uniformed officer approached
Mr. Grant head-on and stopped directly in his path. The officer asked Mr.
Grant “what was going on”, and requested his name and address. In response, Mr. Grant produced a provincial health card. At one point, Mr.
Grant, behaving nervously, adjusted his jacket, prompting the officer to
tell him to “keep his hands in front of him”. By this time, the two plainclothes officers had also approached, flashed their badges and stood
behind the uniformed officer. Pointed questions followed, with Mr. Grant
being asked if he was carrying anything that he “shouldn’t have”, an exchange that culminated in Mr. Grant admitting that he was in possession
of marijuana and a firearm and being arrested.
The preliminary approach and general questioning of Mr. Grant was
not enough to trigger a detention, the Court found, because “a reasonable
person would not have concluded he or she was being deprived of the right
to choose how to act”.53 But a detention arose, the Court ruled, when the
uniformed officer told him to “keep his hands in front of him”.54 While in
some cases such a statement might be viewed merely as a “precautionary
directive”,55 here the encounter was “inherently intimidating”.56 This conclusion was buttressed, the Court reasoned, by the arrival of two additional
police officers who flashed their badges before taking up “tactical positions”; the fact that Mr. Grant was being singled out; the posing of probing,
interrogative questions; and Mr. Grant’s youth and inexperience.
Contrast this with the facts in Suberu.57 There, a police officer attended at a liquor (“LCBO”) store in response to reports that two
suspects were attempting to use a stolen credit card. On entering the
store, the officer saw another police officer speaking with a store employee and another man. At this point, Mr. Suberu walked past the officer
towards the exit and told him, “he did this, not me, so I guess I can go.”
The officer followed Mr. Suberu outside and said, “Wait a minute. I need
to talk to you before you go anywhere.” While Mr. Suberu was seated in
the driver’s seat of a van, but turned outwards, facing the officer, there
was a brief exchange during which the officer asked about Mr. Suberu’s
53
54
55
56
57

Id., at para. 47.
Id., at paras. 49-52.
Id., at para. 48.
Id., at para. 50.
Suberu, supra, note 2.
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relationship to the man inside the store, where the two men had come
from, and who owned the van. As they spoke, the officer received further
information over his radio linking the van and Mr. Suberu to the use of a
stolen credit card at other locations earlier in the day (a Wal-Mart and an
LCBO store). The officer then asked for Mr. Suberu’s identification and
vehicle ownership. As he did so, he saw shopping bags inside the van
from Wal-Mart and the LCBO and arrested Mr. Suberu.
Applying the Grant factors, the Supreme Court upheld the trial
judge’s conclusion that Mr. Suberu was not detained before his arrest.58
The Court began by noting that when police believe a crime has recently
been committed, they “may engage in preliminary questioning of bystanders without giving rise to a detention under ss. 9 and 10 of the
Charter”.59 While the “line between general questioning and focused
interrogation amounting to detention may be difficult to draw in particular cases”, the Court concluded that the trial judge’s “findings on the
facts, supported by the evidence” lead to the conclusion that the officer’s
questions were merely “exploratory” and he had “not yet zeroed in on the
individual as someone whose movements must be controlled”.60
The Court also considered the words used by the officer (“wait a
minute, I need to talk to you before you go anywhere”). On their face,
the Court observed, these words were equivocal. On the one hand, they
might mean “I need to talk to you to get more information”; on the other,
they could be interpreted “as an order not to leave, suggestive of putting
Mr. Suberu under police control”.61 The Court preferred the former interpretation, emphasizing that the officer made no move to obstruct Mr.
Suberu’s movements, Mr. Suberu remained seated in the van while he
spoke with the officer, and the encounter was “very brief”.62
The trial judge’s conclusion, the Court concluded, was also supported by the lack of evidence regarding Mr. Suberu’s “personal
circumstances, feelings or knowledge”.63 Because he did not testify,
“there was no evidence as to whether he subjectively believed that he
could not leave”.64 Without such evidence, the Court was left with the
evidence of the police officer who testified that he was merely “exploring
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id., at para. 35.
Id., at para. 28.
Id., at paras. 29-31.
Id., at para. 33.
Id., at para. 33.
Id., at para. 34.
Id.
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the situation”, Mr. Suberu never told him he did not wish to speak, and
their conversation was not “strained”.65
The Court thus dismissed the claim that Mr. Suberu’s section 10(b)
Charter rights were violated by the officer, who had proceeded to question him without apprising him of his right to counsel.
4. Problems with the Grant Test
While appellate courts undoubtedly appreciate their nuance, the kind
of open-ended, multi-factored standards developed in Grant create at
least three problems. First, compared to bright-line rules, they give insufficient guidance to police, who must often make snap decisions in
quickly unfolding (and sometimes dangerous) circumstances.66 It is simply unrealistic to expect police to consider a host of situationally variable
factors in deciding whether they have crossed the detention threshold. As
a consequence, their decisions will frequently be wrong (in relation to
what a court will or would have decided ex ante).67 In some cases, they
will incorrectly decide that they have not detained an individual. In many
of these cases, these mistakes will cause Charter violations, because police either had no legal authority to detain (thereby violating section 9) or
failed to issue the required section 10 cautions. Indeed, as noted above, if
police are (wrongly) confident that they have not detained a suspect, they
have little reason to comply with section 10 (especially section 10(b)). If
the Charter is violated in one of these ways, harm is caused to both detainees and the state. Detainees suffer the liberty and self-incrimination
harms that these Charter rights are meant to protect against, and the state
suffers from the diminished probability that factually guilty suspects will
be convicted (because unconstitutionally obtained evidence may be excluded at trial under section 24(2) of the Charter).

65

Id.
See James Stribopoulos, “The Limits of Judicially Created Police Powers: Investigative
Detention after Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299, at 314-15 [hereinafter “Stribopoulos, ‘Limits of
Judicially Created Police Powers’”]; David M. Tanovich, “Elshaw — Rethinking the Meaning of
Detention: The Doctrine of ‘Preliminary Investigatory Detention’ is not Appropriate” (1992) 7 C.R.
(4th) 374, at 380 [hereinafter “Tanovich, ‘Elshaw’”]; Kenneth C. Davis, Police Discretion (St. Paul:
West Publishing Co., 1975), at 170; Kenneth C. Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Report
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1969), at 25-26, 42, 94-95 [hereinafter “Davis, Discretionary Justice”].
67
See Steven Penney, “Triggering the Right to Counsel: ‘Detention’ and Section 10 of the
Charter” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 271, at 283-85 [hereinafter “Penney, ‘Triggering the Right’”];
Gold, supra, note 23.
66
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A complete account of the harm to detainees generated by Charter
violations of this kind must also acknowledge the phenomenon of discriminatory profiling.68 It is now widely recognized that the exercise of
police discretion may sometimes be motivated, consciously or subconsciously, by nefarious considerations, like an individual’s age, economic
circumstances, ethnicity or race.69 For example, in recent years a growing
body of evidence has emerged strongly suggesting that both Aboriginals70 and African Canadians71 are stopped by police at disproportionately higher rates than members of other racial groups.72

68
See generally R. v. Storrey, [1990] S.C.J. No. 12, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241, at 251-52 (S.C.C.)
(s. 9 of the Charter is violated if an arrest is undertaken “because a police officer was biased towards
a person of a different race, nationality or colour, or that there was a personal enmity between a
police officer directed towards the person arrested.”). Of course, if a police officer is motivated by
some bias that implicates one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination under s. 15(1) of the Charter, then that section would also be violated. See also Brown v. Durham (Regional Municipality)
Police Force, [1998] O.J. No. 5274, 131 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 116-17 (Ont. C.A.) (s. 9 violated by detentions carried out for “improper purposes”, including “purposes which are illegal, purposes which
involve the infringement of a person’s constitutional rights and purposes which have nothing to do
with the execution of a police officer’s public duty”).
69
See Richard V. Ericson, Reproducing Order: A Study of Police Patrol Work (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1982), at 16-17, 200-201 (noting that the police tend to proactively stop
young males of lower socio-economic status and that, depending on the region, race may also play a
role — for example, blacks in certain urban areas or Native Canadians in rural areas on the Prairies).
70
See Public Inquiry into the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People, Report of
the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba. Volume 1: The Justice System and Aboriginal People
(Winnipeg: Queen’s Printer, 1991), at 595; Task Force on the Criminal Justice System and Its Impact on the Indian and Metis People of Alberta, Justice on Trial (Edmonton: Task Force, 1991), at 25, 2-46 to 2-51.
71
See Ontario, Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System
(Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995), at 349-60; Carl E. James, “‘Up To No Good’: Black
on the Streets and Encountering Police” in Vic Satzewich, ed., Racism & Social Inequality in Canada: Concepts, Controversies and Strategies of Resistance (Toronto: Thompson, 1998) 157;
Robynne Neugebauer, “Kids, Cops, and Colour: The Social Organization of Police-Minority Youth
Relations” in Robynne Neugebauer, ed., Criminal Injustice: Racism in the Criminal Justice System
(Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 2000); Jim Rankin et al., “Police Target Black Drivers,” Toronto
Star (October 20, 2002), online: <http://www.thestar.com/specialsections/raceandcrime/article/
761200--police-target-black-drivers>. But see Ron Melchers, “Do Toronto Police Engage in Racial
Profiling?”(2003) 45 Can. J. Crim. 347. But see also Scot Wortley, “Data, Denials, and Confusion:
The Racial Profiling Debate in Toronto” (2003) 45 Can. J. Crim. 367. More recently, see Jim Rankin, “Race Matters: Blacks documented by police at high rate” Toronto Star (February 6, 2010),
online: <http://www.thestar.com/specialsections/raceandcrime/article/761343--race-matters-blacksdocumented-by-police-at-high-rate>.
72
For an excellent summary of the compelling evidence that racial profiling is a reality in
Canada, see David M. Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin,
2006).
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Responding to this evidence, two provincial appellate courts have recently acknowledged the existence of racial profiling,73 which the
Ontario Court of Appeal has defined as
that phenomenon whereby certain criminal activity is attributed to an
identified group in society on the basis of race or colour resulting in the
targeting of individual members of that group. In this context, race is
illegitimately used as a proxy for the criminality or general criminal
propensity of an entire racial group. The attitude underlying racial
profiling is one that may be consciously or unconsciously held. That is,
the police officer need not be an overt racist. His or her conduct may be
based on subconscious racial stereotyping.74

Of course, in the individual case, establishing that race improperly75
influenced a police officer’s decision to detain or arrest is no easy task.76
As a result, successful claims of discriminatory profiling remain extraordinarily rare in criminal proceedings.77 Nevertheless, the empirical evidence
makes plain that the impact of erroneous police decisions that have not
triggered a detention will fall disproportionately on visible minorities. In
other words, the inherent uncertainty of the Grant approach to detention
unfortunately tends to make racial profiling more, not less, likely.78
The second problem with Grant’s open-ended approach is that it will
likely be applied in a manner that, on average, undervalues individuals’
Charter-protected interests. As mentioned, police have a strong incentive
to avoid warning suspects of their right to counsel.79 Because the line
73
See R. v. Brown, [2003] O.J. No. 1251, 64 O.R. (3d) 161, at paras. 7-9 (Ont. C.A.); R. v.
H. (C.R.), [2003] M.J. No. 90, 173 Man. R. (2d) 113, at para. 49 (Man. C.A.).
74
R. v. Brown, id., at paras. 7-8.
75
In some circumstances police may legitimately rely on an individual’s race in deciding
whether to investigate a suspect. See Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, “Racial Profiling Under
Attack” (2002) 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1413 (“it is not racial profiling for an officer to question, stop,
search, arrest, or otherwise investigate a person because his race or ethnicity matches information
about a perpetrator of a specific crime that the officer is investigating”). But see David Tanovich,
“Moving Beyond ‘Driving While Black’: Race, Suspect Description and Selection” (2004-2005) 36
Ottawa L. Rev. 315 (cautioning against placing too much weight on generic racial descriptors).
76
See generally David Tanovich, “E-Racing Racial Profiling” (2004) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 905
(chronicling many of the practical obstacles to proving such claims and suggesting ways in which
they might be overcome).
77
See, e.g., R. v. Peck, [2001] O.J. No. 4581 (Ont. S.C.J.).
78
See Tracey Maclin, “Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men And Police
Discretion” (1998) 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 1271, at 1320 (“[h]istory teaches us that when law enforcement personnel are given loosely supervised discretionary powers, police behaviour will reflect
biases and prejudices of individual officers”). In Grant, only Binnie J. explicitly acknowledged the
disproportionate impact of unjustified stops on racial minorities and other marginalized persons:
Grant, supra, note 1, at paras. 154, 169, Binnie J., concurring.
79
Hill, supra, note 9.
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between detention and non-detention is blurry, and the prospect of evidentiary exclusion distant and uncertain, this incentive will often tempt
police to stretch the boundary of non-detention past its breaking point.80
That risk will be especially great when police are engaged in community
policing efforts and their primary concern is the maintenance of order
rather than collecting admissible evidence for prosecution.81
Finally, in the few cases that do go to trial, judges also have strong
incentives to avoid evidentiary exclusion. As discussed above, an inherent selection bias presents mostly factually guilty defendants to the
courts. The benefits of evidentiary exclusion (encouraging police compliance with Charter norms, protecting individual liberty against
unjustified state interference, and disassociating courts from police malfeasance) are distant, systemic and ephemeral. The cost (the potential
acquittal of the factually guilty), in contrast, is immediate, direct and visceral. In this milieu, the flexibility of the Grant factors will most often
inure to the benefit of the state. With a reviewing court’s focus dispersed
over a long list of relevant considerations, the coercive nature of a dynamic encounter can easily become obscured.82
In our view, this is precisely what happened in Suberu, where the
Court arguably ignored Grant’s admonition to engage in “a realistic
appraisal of the entire interaction as it developed, not a minute parsing
of words and movements”.83 Recall that the majority interpreted the
statement “wait a minute, I need to talk to you before you go any80
See Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society
(New York: MacMillan, 1994), at 12 (noting that “whenever rules of constraint are ambiguous, they
strengthen the very conduct they are intended to restrain”).
81
See Mastrofski, supra, note 42. See also Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, “Street Stops and
Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City” (2000) 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 457,
at 476-77 (presenting data suggesting that many arrests under “Broken Windows” initiative undertaken with little concern about constitutional compliance because getting guns off the street rather
than successful prosecutions was in fact the objective). Of course, if police are wholly unconcerned
with obtaining such evidence, the prospect of exclusion will not deter overreaching even when the
constitutional limitations on their powers are clearly delineated.
82
See William J. Stuntz, “Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies” (1991) 77 Va. L.
Rev. 881, at 912-13; Carole S. Steiker, “Second Thoughts About First Principles” (1994) 107 Harv.
L. Rev. 820, at 852-53. More generally, the influence of “hindsight bias” is extraordinarily well
documented within psychology. For a review of the literature, see Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie,
“Hindsight: Biased Judgment of Past Events After the Outcomes are Known” (1990) 107 Psychological Bulletin 311. Some studies have specifically linked this phenomenon to legal decisionmaking, although each such study has necessarily involved simulations. See Jonathan D. Casper,
Kennette Benedict & Janice R. Kelly, “Cognitions, Attitudes, and Decision-Making in Search and
Seizure Cases” (1988) 18 J. Applied Social Psychology 93; Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Mark S. Sobus, “An Integration of Hindsight Bias and Counterfactual Thinking: Decision-Making and Drug
Courier Profiles” (1997) 21 Law & Hum. Behav. 539.
83
Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 32.
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where” as a mere request for information.84 However, as Binnie J. persuasively argued in dissent, viewing that comment in context makes the
officer’s meaning plain:
The verbal exchange between Constable Roughley and Mr. Suberu
clearly established an unambiguous police order. When Mr. Suberu
walked past Constable Roughley, saying, “He did this, not me, so I
guess I can go”, and Constable Roughley replied, “Wait a minute. I
need to talk to you before you go anywhere”, it was a command to stay
put. Constable Roughley’s words were only ambiguous if one ignores
the preceding remark from Mr. Suberu. Constable Roughley was
replying to Mr. Suberu, who had essentially said, “Can I leave?”, by
essentially saying, “No”. It was clear to Mr. Suberu that he was not free
to go “anywhere” and any reasonable person in that position would
have come to the same conclusion.85

The majority’s approach was no doubt motivated by the practical difficulties of implementing the right to counsel incidental to investigation
detention.86 But the Court’s solution to this problem — defining detention so amorphously that it need not capture all situations where
reasonable people would believe that they were “not free to go and had
to comply with the police direction or demand”87 — it is akin to killing
the patient to cure a cold. While it avoids the impracticality of complying
with section 10(b) of the Charter, in the process it immunizes a host of
highly coercive encounters from scrutiny under section 9. As we discuss
below, there are other solutions to the section 10(b) problem that would
allow police to engage in brief, preliminary questioning without issuing
the section 10(b) caution.
The final problem posed by the Grant factors is that, even if judges do
find a detention, the flexibility of the exclusionary discretion under section
24(2) of the Charter (also reformulated by the Court in Grant) provides
ample opportunity to excuse police mistakes. Certainly deliberate and negligent Charter violations are likely to result in exclusion.88 Where police
84

Suberu, supra, note 2, at paras. 33-34.
Id., at para. 56, Binnie J., dissenting. In separate reasons Fish J. also dissented, agreeing
with Binnie J. that Mr. Suberu was detained. See Suberu, id., Fish J., dissenting.
86
See Suberu, id., at paras. 47-48, Binnie J. dissenting.
87
Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 31.
88
Id., at para. 75 (“It follows that deliberate police conduct in violation of established Charter standards tends to support exclusion of the evidence.”); R. v. Harrison, [2009] S.C.J. No. 34,
[2009] 2 S.C.R. 494, at para. 22 (S.C.C.) (violation considered serious when “departure from Charter standards was major in degree, or where the police knew (or should have known) that their
conduct was not Charter-compliant”).
85
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(unintentionally) err in applying indeterminate legal standards, however,
courts often decline to exclude under section 24(2). In Grant, the Court
noted that “the point at which an encounter becomes a detention is not always clear, and is something with which courts have struggled”.89 Since
police there were “operating in circumstances of considerable legal uncertainty,” their failure to comply with section 10(b) was “understandable”,
tipping the “balance in favour of admission”.90 Making the rules clearer for
police will reduce that uncertainty; police compliance with Charter standards would then become more likely,91 as would the potential for a
remedy in those cases where an individual’s rights are violated.
5. Reform
How might this situation be improved? In short, the courts should
interpret and apply Grant in a manner that provides as much ex ante
certainty to police as possible. In that regard, the experience in provincial appellate courts after Therens92 is instructive. Shortly after Therens
was decided, the Ontario Court of Appeal articulated a test for detention that is similar in many ways to the approach in Grant. In R. v.
Moran, Martin J.A. set out a list of relevant criteria in a case involving
an accused interviewed by police at the station-house on two separate
occasions during the course of a homicide investigation.93 The Moran
89

Grant, id., at para. 133.
Id., at paras. 133, 140.
91
See Steven Penney, “Taking Deterrence Seriously: Excluding Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence Under Section 24(2) of the Charter” (2004) 49 McGill L.J. 105, at 136-38.
92
See R. v. Moran, [1987] O.J. No. 794, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225, at 258-59 (Ont. C.A.), leave to
appeal refused [1988] S.C.C.A. No. 213, [1988] 1 S.C.R. xi (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Moran”]. This
approach is similar to that taken in the United States in determining whether the suspect is in “custody” for the purposes of the Miranda warning. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 437 (1966);
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, at 323 (1994);
Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel & Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure, 3d ed. (St. Paul, Minn.:
West, 2000) § 6.6.
93
See Moran, id., at 258-59, where Martin J.A. identified the following criteria:
1. The precise language used by the police officer in requesting the person who subsequently becomes an accused to come to the police station, and whether the accused was
given a choice or expressed a preference that the interview be conducted at the police station, rather than at his or her home;
2. Whether the accused was escorted to the police station by a police officer or came himself or herself in response to a police request;
3. Whether the accused left at the conclusion of the interview or whether he or she was arrested;
4. The stage of the investigation, that is, whether the questioning was part of the general investigation of a crime or possible crime or whether the police had already decided that a
crime had been committed and that the accused was the perpetrator or involved in its
90
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criteria were adopted by most courts of appeal94 and applied to many
different types of police-suspect encounters, including the questioning of
pedestrians.95
At first glance, the Moran approach appears at least as open-ended
and indeterminate as Grant. A close look at the jurisprudence, however,
reveals that most often (including in Moran itself) detention turned on
the (related) fourth, fifth and sixth factors, namely, the stage of the investigation, the degree of suspicion attaching to the accused and the nature
of the questioning.96
Before Grant, a detention was usually found when police identified
the accused as the likely perpetrator and conducted questioning with a
view to inducing self-incriminating statements.97 When both of these
commission and the questioning was conducted for the purpose of obtaining incriminating statements from the accused;
5. Whether the police had reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the accused had
committed the crime being investigated;
6. The nature of the questions: whether they were questions of a general nature designed to
obtain information or whether the accused was confronted with evidence pointing to his
or her guilt;
7. The subjective belief by an accused that he or she is detained, although relevant, is not decisive, because the issue is whether he or she reasonably believed that he or she was detained.
Personal circumstances relating to the accused, such as low intelligence, emotional disturbance, youth and lack of sophistication are circumstances to be considered in determining
whether he had a subjective belief that he was detained.
94
See R. v. Johns, [1998] O.J. No. 445, 14 C.R. (5th) 302, at para. 23 (Ont. C.A.); R. v.
Voss, [1989] O.J. No. 1124, 33 O.A.C. 190 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Caputo, [1997] O.J. No. 857, 114
C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 11 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. H. (C.R.), [2003] M.J. No. 90, 174 C.C.C. (3d) 67, at paras.
27-30 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Amyot, [1990] J.Q. no 1067, 58 C.C.C. (3d) 312 (Que. C.A.); R. v. V.
(T.A.), [2001] A.J. No. 1679, 48 C.R. (5th) 366, at para. 18 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Gaudette, [2006] J.Q.
no 8112, 2006 QCCA 1004, at para. 37 (Que. C.A.); R. v. C. (S.), [1989] N.J. No. 81, 74 Nfld. &
P.E.I.R. 252 (Nfld. C.A.); R. v. Groat, [2006] B.C.J. No. 109, 2006 BCCA 27 (B.C.C.A.); R. v.
Priddle, [2003] B.C.J. No. 2671, 2003 BCCA 637 (B.C.C.A.).
95
See, e.g., R. v. B. (L.), [2007] O.J. No. 3290, 227 C.C.C. (3d) 70 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. H.
(C.R.), id.; R. v. Grafe, supra, note 27; R. v. Hall, [1995] O.J. No. 544, 22 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.);
R. v. V. (T.A.), id.
96
For example, writing for the Manitoba Court of Appeal in H. (C.R.), Steele J. held that
police did not detain a pedestrian even though they asked for his identification and checked his name
against a computer database. See R. v. H. (C.R.), supra, note 94. See also R. v. B. (L.), id., at para. 67
(request for pedestrian’s identity and running of database check did not trigger detention). Subsequently, Steele J. concluded for the same court in R. v. Dolynchuck, [2004] M.J. No. 135, 184 C.C.C.
(3d) 214, at para. 32 (Man. C.A.) that police did detain the accused when they questioned him in a
parking lot after receiving a tip that he had been driving while impaired. Police had more than a
mere suspicion that he had committed this offence, indicated that they would have detained him for
investigative purposes after they confirmed his identity, and asked him a question (“were you driving?”), the answer to which provided proof of an element of the offence. Police had “already decided
that a crime had been committed and that the accused was the perpetrator” and their question was
designed to obtain “incriminating statements”.
97
See, e.g., R. v. Voss, supra, note 94, at 204 (“the police investigation changed from one of
trying to determine a cause of death to one of trying to get information from a man who is alleged to
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conditions were present, a detention was usually triggered even when
suspects were told that they were free to leave or to decline answering
questions.98 Conversely, when one of these conditions was not present
(such as accusatory questioning), a detention was usually not found even
if police had grounds to detain or arrest at the conclusion of questioning.99 It thus appeared that while courts formally applied an open-ended,
“totality of the circumstances” approach, like that endorsed in Grant, the
results in actual cases were dictated by a (relatively) “bright-line” standard. In all but a few cases, detention was found when (and only when),
police attempted to elicit incriminating statements from the likely perpetrator of the offence under investigation.100
To be clear, we do not mean to argue that the Moran criteria, as narrowed and refined in subsequent cases, should be resurrected to replace
the various factors identified in Grant. In fact, as we detail below, the
controlling considerations that emerged in Moran are under-inclusive
because they fail to provide any protection where the police have no offence in mind but are instead engaged in an invasive fishing expedition,
as they were in Grant.101 The Moran factors were developed with section
have and has admitted to having assaulted his wife in order to determine if he was implicated in the
death”); R. v. Pomeroy, [2008] O.J. No. 2550, 2008 ONCA 521, at para. 37 (Ont. C.A.) (“The focus
of the interview was to gain general information as part of the investigation of the ‘suspicious death’;
the questioning was not conducted for the purpose of obtaining incriminating statements from the
appellant”); R. v. Caputo, supra, note 94, at para. 27 (“The questioning up to that point appears to
have been general in nature and directed toward obtaining a witness statement from the appellant. He
had not yet been confronted with evidence pointing to his guilt or to the contradictions between his
statements and the other evidence that was being gathered as the investigation continued”).
98
See R. v. Johns, supra, note 94, at para. 28 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Teske, [2005] O.J. No. 3759,
202 O.A.C. 239, at para. 55 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Rajaratnam, [2006] A.J. No. 1373, 214 C.C.C. (3d)
547, at para. 17 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Lee, [2007] A.J. No. 1183, 2007 ABCA 337 (Alta. C.A.).
99
See R. v. Pomeroy, supra, note 97, at para. 37; R. v. Hall, [2004] O.J. No. 5007, 193
O.A.C. 7, at para. 22 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. B. (L.), supra, note 95, at paras. 56-57.
100
This test is similar to that set out in R. v. Hawkins, [1992] N.J. No. 147, 14 C.R. (4th) 286
(Nfld. C.A.), revd [1993] S.C.J. No. 50, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.), but without reference to the
intention of police to arrest or charge suspects. See also Tim Quigley, Procedure in Canadian
Criminal Law, 2d ed. (looseleaf) (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2006) § 5.3(c)(ii) [hereinafter “Quigley”]; Tanovich, “Elshaw”, supra, note 66, at 380; Stuart, supra, note 8, at 326-27; Penney,
“Triggering the Right, supra, note 67, at 284-85; Steven Penney, “What’s Wrong with SelfIncrimination? The Wayward Path of Self-Incrimination Law in the Post-Charter Era, Part 2: SelfIncrimination in Police Investigations” (2004) 48 Crim. L.Q. 280, at 320-21 [hereinafter “Penney,
‘What’s Wrong?’”].
101
This is the principal reason why we also disagree with Binnie J.’s proposed approach for
defining detention, which would emphasize the perception and intention of police. See Grant, supra,
note 1, at para. 180, Binnie J., concurring. We worry that in the hands of lower court judges, a police
officer’s assertion that “I didn’t suspect the accused of anything, I was just having a chat” would too
easily allow highly coercive encounters to avoid being labelled detentions. We are especially concerned about certain so-called “community policing programs”, like the Toronto Anti-Violence
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10 of the Charter in mind and are most relevant to formal, “sit down”
interviews conducted at the police station or other suitable location. They
were not designed to address the section 9 liberty interests implicated by
impromptu, “in the field” inquiries of pedestrians, motorists, and the like.
We reference Moran’s treatment only to stress that not all factors under a
multi-factor approach are deserving of equal emphasis. By focusing on
Intervention Strategy (“TAVIS”). TAVIS is a relatively recent initiative of the Toronto Police Service. Its stated purpose (“an intensive, violence reduction and community mobilization strategy
intended to reduce crime and increase safety in our neighbourhoods”) is laudable. See Toronto Police Service, TAVIS, available online: <http://www.torontopolice.on.ca/tavis>. In practice, however,
it involves large teams of police officers proactively policing “high-crime” neighbourhoods and
engaging in aggressive stop and frisk practices. Those stopped are asked to produce identification
and routinely searched. Individuals who are in possession of drugs or weapons are arrested, as are
those for whom there are outstanding warrants or who happen to be breaching the terms of a bail or
probation order. For others, the encounter often only ends after the police have completed a “contact
card”, known within the Toronto Police Service as a “208 card”. See Timothy Appleby, “New police
strategy designed to blanket high-violence areas”, The Globe and Mail, February 13, 2006, A1;
Moira Welsh, “Elite Toronto police squad goes looking for trouble”, Toronto Star (February 8,
2010) available online: <http://www.thestar.com/specialsections/raceandcrime/article/761310--elitetoronto-police-squad-goes-looking-for-trouble>.
The use of these cards was explained by LaForme J. in R. v. Ferdinand, [2004] O.J. No. 3209,
21 C.R. (6th) 65, at paras. 12, 16 (Ont. S.C.J.):
A 208 card is approximately 3” by 5” and is printed on both sides, commencing with the
words, “Person Investigated”. It records information obtained from a person who is
stopped by the police that includes information such as, “name, aliases, date of birth, colour, address, and contact location including the time”. On the back it has entries for
things such as: “associates” and “associated with: gang, motorcycle club, Drug Treatment
Court”. The police then input the information from the completed 208 cards into a police
computer database for their future reference.
.....
There is no evidence that any police officer advises, or has ever advised, any person
stopped that they have a right not to answer any questions from this card and that they are
free to leave if they wish. The testimony of the two young men from the neighbourhood
is that: The police “always stop them, and always search them”, and they are not told they
do not have to answer. They add that, persons stopped by these two officers always answer questions and submit to searches because they believe they have to, and that it does
not do any good not to.
It is fair to say that LaForme J. was troubled by the way in which these cards were being used.
In a rather prescient comment, he noted that the “impression that one could draw from the information sought on these 208 cards — along with the current manner in which they are being used — is
that they could be a tool utilized for racial profiling”. Id., at para. 21.
In 2010, the Toronto Star gained access, by means of a freedom of information request, to the
data compiled by Toronto police using the 208 cards. See Toronto Police Services Board v. Ontario
(Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2009] O.J. No. 90, 93 O.R. (3d) 563 (Ont. C.A.). After
analyzing the data, which includes racial descriptors of the persons stopped and questioned, the
Toronto Star reported that black males between the ages of 15 and 24 are 2.5 times more likely to be
stopped and documented than white males the same age. See Jim Rankin, “Race Matters: Blacks
documented by police at high rate” Toronto Star (February 6, 2010), online: <http://www.thestar.
com/specialsections/raceandcrime/article/761343--race-matters-blacks-documented-by-police-athigh-rate>.
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the key variables identified in Grant, courts can both give police clear
guidance and achieve a more optimal accommodation between the conflicting interests implicated by police-citizen encounters.
Of course, this raises the questions: which of the Grant factors are
most important to achieving this accommodation and what guidance
should courts give to the police in future cases? In the aftermath of
Grant, we would emphasize two variables:
(1) The language used to initiate the encounter. Permissive language
would be far less likely to result in a detention than obligatory language. For example, in the context of a street stop, “I’d like to speak
with you” or “Would you mind if I asked you some questions?”
would be unlikely to result in a detention. A detention would likely
arise, in contrast, from “Stay right there!”, “Freeze!”, or “Show me
some identification!”102 Similarly, for “sit down” interviews, “I’d
like to speak with you at a time and place of your choosing” is less
likely to trigger detention than, “We want you to come with us to the
police station to talk about this right now.”103
(2) The nature of any ensuing questioning. Purely exploratory questions
are unlikely to trigger detention. By this we would include situations
such as a police officer approaching a pedestrian and asking, “How are
things?” or an officer responding to an emergency call and asking
someone present, “What’s going on?” In contrast, detention is much
more likely to be found when police approach a pedestrian, ask for
identification, and ask questions like, “Where are you coming from?”,
“What are you doing?”, “Where are you going?” or “Do you have any
102
Unfortunately, Grant did not address whether a police demand for identification results in
a detention. When police asked Mr. Grant for his name and address, he produced his provincial
health card without a police request, so the question did not arise. A number of pre-Grant cases
suggest that such a request does not result in a detention. See R. v. B. (L.), supra, note 95; R. v. Hall,
supra, note 95, at paras. 21-23; R. v. H. (C.R.), supra, note 94, at paras. 33-36. Post-Grant, it remains
to be seen how this question will be resolved. Obviously, police must be free to approach people and
engage them in conversation, which includes the social pleasantry of asking someone’s name. Few
would feel compelled to remain in a police officer’s presence because of such a routine and benign
question. But a police request for identification is undoubtedly different. Given a police officer’s
position of authority, most people would not hesitate in complying with what they would reasonably
perceive as a demand. And, surely, once a police officer is holding your identification (especially if
while doing so simultaneously peppering you with questions regarding where you are coming from,
where you are going, whether you have anything in your possession that you shouldn’t, etc.), most
people would not think that they are free to leave.
103
See Moran, supra, note 92, at 258 (stressing scrutiny of language used in requesting person to come to the police station and “whether the accused was given a choice or expressed a
preference that the interview be conducted at the police station, rather than at his or her home”).
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weapons or drugs?” In the latter circumstances, few reasonable people
would feel free to walk away. Similarly, in a more formal interview
context, a detention would not likely arise from open-ended, nonaccusatory questions designed to gather preliminary information;
questions designed to elicit self-incriminating evidence from someone
strongly suspected of committing a crime likely would.
The first of these variables targets the liberty interests inhering in section 9,104 the second aims to protect the interests inhering in section 10(b)
— preventing inquisitorial abuses and compelled self-incrimination.105
Each also allows police to seek preliminary investigative information without significant restraint. It follows that a detention should usually be found
when either of these factors points in that direction. If courts were to require both, one of these Charter-protected interests would frequently be
left unprotected. Without factor (1), as long as they do not engage in interrogation-like questioning, police could coercively restrain people’s
freedom without reasonable suspicion that they have committed a crime.
And without factor (2), as long as they do not coercively restrain people’s
freedom, police could conduct accusatory (and potentially abusive) interrogations, again without reasonable suspicion and without extending the
protections of the right to counsel.
In addition to enabling a better balance between individual and law
enforcement interests, our proposal gives police much more concrete
guidance than the open-ended Grant factors. In short, it tells them that if
they do not want to detain, they should use permissive language and refrain from interrogating. Conversely, it warns them that if they use
compulsory language to initiate encounters with suspects or engage in
the functional equivalent of an interrogation, they will likely have triggered a detention and must thus comply with sections 9, 10(a) and
(subject to any changes to the law that we advocate for below) 10(b) of
the Charter. In other words, they must have reasonable grounds to suspect an individual of being involved in a recently committed or unfolding
criminal offence, tell that person why he or she has been detained, and
104
In Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 20, the Court finally took the opportunity to expressly
acknowledge the purpose underlying this important Charter right, which it recognized as being,
“broadly put … to protect individual liberty from unjustified state interference”. Rather remarkably,
even though s. 9 of the Charter had been before the Court on 24 prior occasions, it has never before
expressly identified its purpose. See Stribopoulos, “The Forgotten Right”, supra, note 8, at 214-23.
105
See Suberu, supra, note 2, at para. 40; R. v. Manninen, [1987] S.C.J. No. 41, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 1233, at 1242-43 (S.C.C.); R. v. Brydges, [1990] S.C.J. No. 8, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190, at 203,
206, 215 (S.C.C.); R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173, at 191 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Prosper, supra, note 17, at 271.
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inform the person of the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay.
As mentioned, the Court suggested in Grant that if the police want to
avoid engaging these various Charter rights, there is a relatively simple
solution: tell the affected individual in unambiguous terms that he or she
is under no obligation to answer questions and is free to go. This suggestion, we caution, should be read very strictly. In the context of brief “in
the field” inquiries, such a statement would likely be enough to convey
to most people that they are truly not required to cooperate. In the context of accusatory questioning at the police station (and perhaps other “sit
down” interviews), something more may be required to impress upon
suspects that they are not under legal constraint.106 It would be prudent,
for example, to require suspects in such circumstances to read, understand and sign a statement (perhaps repeatedly in the case of lengthy
interviews) clearly explaining that they are legally entitled to leave or
remain silent.

III. INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION AND SECTION 10 OF THE CHARTER
1. History and Context
As noted, the reforms to Grant’s conception of non-legal psychological detention that we have proposed do not address the problem of
applying the section 10(b) right to counsel to suspects lawfully detained
for investigative purposes. Before 1993, police had no power to detain
short of carrying out a formal arrest.107 All this changed with the Court of
106
See the cases cited supra, note 98 (finding detention in the context of accusatory “sit
down” interviews despite police statements that suspects were free to leave or remain silent).
107
See R. v. Hicks, [1988] O.J. No. 957, 42 C.C.C. (3d) 394, at 400 (Ont. C.A.), affd on
other grounds [1990] S.C.J. No. 7, 54 C.C.C. (3d) 575 (S.C.C.); R. v. Moran, supra, note 92, at 258;
R. v. Esposito, [1985] O.J. No. 1002, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 88, at 94 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused
[1986] S.C.C.A. No. 63, [1986] 1 S.C.R. viii (S.C.C.); R. v. Dedman, [1981] O.J. No. 2993, 59
C.C.C. (2d) 97, at 108-109 (Ont. C.A.), affd on other grounds [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, 20 C.C.C. (3d)
97 (S.C.C.); R. v. Cluett, [1982] N.S.J. No. 542, 3 C.C.C. (3d) 333, at 347-48 (Ont. C.A.), revd on
other grounds [1985] S.C.J. No. 54, 21 C.C.C. (3d) 318 (S.C.C.); R. v. Guthrie, [1982] A.J. No. 29,
69 C.C.C. (2d) 216, at 218-19 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Moore, [1978] S.C.J. No. 82, 43 C.C.C. (2d) 83, at
89-90 (S.C.C.); Rice v. Connolly, [1966] 2 Q.B. 414, at 419 (C.A.); Kenlin v. Gardner, [1967] 2
Q.B. 510 (C.A.); Koechlin v. Waugh, [1957] O.J. No. 105, 118 C.C.C. 24, at 26-27 (Ont. C.A.); Alan
Young, “All Along The Watchtower: Arbitrary Detention and the Police Function” (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall L.J. 329, at 330, 343; David C. McDonald, Legal Rights in the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1989), at 303-304; Law Reform Commission of
Canada, Arrest (Working Paper 41) (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1985), at 33, 37; Steve
Coughlan, “Police Detention: A Proposal” (1985) 28 Crim. L.Q. 64, at 66, 77.
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Appeal for Ontario’s decision in Simpson.108 The Simpson court used the
ancillary powers doctrine to recognize a power to briefly detain when
police have “articulable cause” to believe that the person is involved in
criminal activity.109
The investigative detention power recognized in Simpson was ultimately endorsed by appellate courts across the country.110 It took 11
years, however, for the Supreme Court of Canada to finally give it its
stamp of approval. Acknowledging that “police officers must be empowered to respond quickly, effectively, and flexibly to the diversity of
encounters experienced daily on the front lines of policing”, in R. v.
Mann the Court applied the ancillary powers doctrine to recognize an
investigative detention power.111
In Mann, the Court held that an individual may be briefly detained
where police have reasonable grounds to suspect a clear nexus between
the individual being detained and a recently committed or still unfolding
criminal offence.112 An investigative detention that is carried out in accordance with this common law power, the Court explained, is not
“arbitrary” and thus does not infringe section 9 of the Charter.113
The Court also held that where suspects are lawfully detained for investigative purposes, police may conduct a limited protective pat-down
search. “Such a search power does not exist as a matter of course”, the
Court explained, “the officer must believe on reasonable grounds that his

108

Supra, note 8.
Id., at 499-502.
110
See R. v. Ferris, [1998] B.C.J. No. 1415, 126 C.C.C. (3d) 298 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Dupuis,
[1994] A.J. No. 1011, 162 A.R. 197 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Lake, [1996] S.J. No. 886, 113 C.C.C. (3d)
208 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. G. (C.M.), [1996] M.J. No. 428, 113 Man. R. (2d) 76 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Pigeon, [1993] J.Q. no 1683, 59 Q.A.C. 103 (Que. C.A.); R. v. Carson, [1998] N.B.J. No. 482, 39
M.V.R. (3d) 55 (N.B.C.A.); R. v. Chabot, [1993] N.S.J. No. 465, 86 C.C.C. (3d) 309 (N.S.C.A.); R.
v. Burke, [1997] N.J. No. 187, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 59 (Nfld. C.A.).
111
R. v. Mann, supra, note 7, at para. 16.
112
Id., at paras. 34, 45. Unfortunately, the Court could have been clearer on whether the investigative detention power identified was limited to crimes actually known to police or whether it
also extends to crimes that are reasonably suspected. The latter explanation makes much more sense
as it allows police to respond to events that they observe while on patrol giving rise to a reasonably
based suspicion that criminality may be afoot. See R. v. Nesbeth, [2008] O.J. No. 3086, 238 C.C.C.
(3d) 567, at para. 18 (Ont. C.A.) (“While the court in Mann speaks of reasonable grounds to suspect
that the individual is connected to ‘a particular crime’, in my view, it is not necessary that the officers be able to pinpoint the crime with absolute precision.”); R. v. Yeh, [2009] S.J. No. 582, 2009
SKCA 112, [2009] 11 W.W.R. 193, at para. 84 (Sask. C.A.) (“a ‘particular crime,’ read in context,
reflects the idea that the police may not detain an individual out of a general sense he or she might be
doing something unlawful. … police suspicions must relate to specific criminal wrongdoing”).
113
Mann, id., at para. 20.
109
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or her own safety, or the safety of others, is at risk”.114 Accordingly, police are not permitted (as they did in Mann) to search for evidence.115
Before Mann, there was no clear and consistent answer as to whether
section 10(a) and (b) of the Charter apply when an individual is subject
to investigative detention.116 In Mann, the Supreme Court thankfully
made clear that section 10(a) of the Charter does apply. The Court
explained that the police must tell the person “in clear and simple
language” of the reasons for the detention.117 Unfortunately, the same
was not true for section 10(b). Although the Supreme Court cautioned in
Mann that the police should not use compliance with that right as an
excuse to unduly and artificially prolong an investigative detention, it
deliberately deferred for another day the more pressing question of
whether or not the right applies.118 It took five more years of uncertainty
before that day arrived.
2. Suberu, Investigative Detention and Section 10(b) of the Charter
As mentioned, in Suberu the Supreme Court of Canada definitively
held that, “subject to concerns for officer or public safety”, police must tell
people subject to investigative detention about their right to retain and instruct counsel immediately upon detention and must do everything
required under section 10(b) to facilitate that right.119 It summarily dismissed the suggestion that a suspension of the right to counsel during such
detentions was justified under section 1 of the Charter, which subjects section 10(b) and other Charter rights to “reasonable limits prescribed by law
114

Id., at para. 40.
Id., at paras. 40-45 (any probing beyond a pat-down for weapons is only justifiable where
a police officer feels something during the initial protective search that raises reasonably based
safety concerns). See also R. v. Duong, [2006] B.C.J. No. 1452, 142 C.R.R. (2d) 261, at para. 56
(B.C.C.A.); R. v. Greaves, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1953, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 305 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. White,
[2007] O.J. No. 1605, 85 O.R. (3d) 407 (Ont. C.A.).
116
See, e.g., R. v. V. (T.A.), supra, note 94, at para. 32 (Alta. C.A.) (“When a brief search is
conducted to ensure the safety of the officers involved, it seems implausible that this must be preceded by a 10(b) warning”); R. v. Lewis, [1998] O.J. No. 376, 122 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at para. 28 (Ont.
C.A.) (“Without deciding whether every investigative detention requires compliance with s. 10(b), I
would hold that this investigative detention, which encompassed a search of the respondent’s luggage, gave rise to an obligation that the police inform the respondent of his right to counsel.”)
117
Mann, supra, note 7, at para. 21.
118
Id., at para. 22.
119
Suberu, supra, note 2, at paras. 2, 42. See also R. v. Strachan, [1988] S.C.J. No. 94,
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 980, at 998-99 (S.C.C.) (s. 10 warnings must be given immediately upon detention
but may be delayed in situations where police need to gain control over a dangerous situation); R. v.
Debot, [1989] S.C.J. No. 118, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140, at 1163-64 (S.C.C.), Wilson J. (same).
115
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as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”. “Because the definition of detention, as understood in these reasons, gives the
police leeway to engage members of the public in non-coercive, exploratory questioning without necessarily triggering their Charter rights relating
to detention,” the Court reasoned, “s. 1 need not be invoked in order to
allow the police to effectively fulfill their investigative duties.”120
Similarly, the Court rejected the view of the court below that the reference to “without delay” in section 10(b) contemplated a “brief interlude”
between the initial investigative detention and the point at which police
must advise suspects of the right to counsel.121 During this period, the
Court of Appeal had concluded, police may make “a quick assessment of
the situation to decide whether anything more than a brief detention of the
individual may be warranted”.122 The Supreme Court explained:
To allow for a delay between the outset of a detention and the
engagement of the police duties under s. 10(b) creates an ill-defined
and unworkable test of the application of the s. 10(b) right. The right to
counsel requires a stable and predictable definition. What constitutes a
permissible delay is abstract and difficult to quantify, whereas the
concept of immediacy leaves little room for misunderstanding. An
ill-defined threshold for the application of the right to counsel must be
avoided, particularly as it relates to a right that imposes specific
123
obligations on the police.

3. Problems with the Suberu Approach
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Mann, investigative detention
“should be brief in duration and does not impose an obligation on the
detained individual to answer questions posed by the police”.124 It further
warned that it cannot be allowed to “become a de facto arrest”.125 In light
of these directives, the Court hinted (though as mentioned it expressly
declined to decide the issue) that applying section 10(b) of the Charter to
investigative detention might not be appropriate. “Mandatory compliance
with [section 10(b)’s] requirements,” it stated, “cannot be transformed

120

Suberu, id., at para. 45.
R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at para. 50 (Ont. C.A.), affd
[2009] S.C.J. No. 33, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.).
122
Id.
123
Suberu, supra, note 2, at para. 42.
124
Mann, supra, note 7, at para. 45.
125
Id., at para. 35.
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into an excuse for prolonging, unduly and artificially, a detention that, as
I later mention, must be of brief duration.”126
These dicta were seemingly ignored in Suberu. In our view, applying
section 10(b) to investigative detention will have bad effects for both law
enforcement and individual liberty. For law enforcement, complying with
section 10(b) involves much more than reading a caution card.127 After
doing so, police must also ensure that detainees understand the caution,
and if there is any indication that they do not, take steps to facilitate understanding.128 Critically, police may not question or otherwise seek to
obtain self-incriminating information from detainees until this understanding is achieved.129
Further, if detainees invoke their right to counsel,130 police must do a
number of things to facilitate it. They must allow detainees to telephone a
lawyer in private131 as soon as reasonably possible.132 If private telephone
126

Id., at para. 22.
In addition to telling those detained that they have a right to talk to a lawyer, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada, s. 10(b) also requires police to inform them of any legal aid
or duty counsel services available in the jurisdiction and provide information on how to contact duty
counsel. See R. v. Brydges, supra, note 105, at 209-10, 212, 215; R. v. Bartle, supra, note 105, at
195-97. This information must be conveyed again whenever the nature of questioning changes in a
way that alters the individual’s potential jeopardy. See R. v. Black, [1989] S.C.J. No. 81, [1989] 2
S.C.R. 138, at 155 (S.C.C.); R. v. Evans, [1991] S.C.J. No. 31, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869, at 890-93
(S.C.C.).
128
See R. v. Evans, id., at 891 (“where … there is a positive indication that the accused does
not understand his right to counsel, the police cannot rely on their mechanical recitation of the right
to the accused; they must take steps to facilitate that understanding”). The degree of understanding
required, however, is modest. See R. v. Whittle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 69, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914, at 933,
939, 941-42 (S.C.C.) (detainees must have “sufficient cognitive capacity to understand what he or
she is saying and what is said”, including “the ability to understand a caution that the evidence can
be used against the accused”; they need not be capable of exercising “analytical reasoning”, or making “a good or wise choice or one that is in his or her interest”.).
129
See, e.g., R. v. Evans, id. (police violated section 10(b) by failing to do anything to explain the right to counsel to a cognitively limited detainee who indicated that he did not understand
it).
130
Invocation requires a positive assertion of the right to speak to a lawyer. See R. v.
Tremblay, [1987] S.C.J. No. 59, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 435, at 439 (S.C.C.); R. v. Hollis, [1992] B.C.J. No.
2066, 76 C.C.C. (3d) 421, at 435 (B.C.C.A.). The Supreme Court has also implicitly required police
to give detainees a reasonable opportunity to ask to speak to a lawyer. See R. v. Feeney, supra, note
17, at para. 58. See also R. v. Woods, [1989] O.J. No. 532, 70 C.R. (3d) 45 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Hollis,
id., per Wood J.A.
131
The courts have typically held that s. 10(b) requires an environment “where the conversation cannot be overhead and there is no reasonable apprehension … of being overheard”: R. v.
Miller, [1990] N.J. No. 305, 87 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 55, at 58 (Nfld. C.A.). See also R. v. Kelly, [1996]
N.J. No. 110, 140 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 14 (Nfld. C.A.); R. v. LePage, [1986] N.S.J. No. 371, 32 C.C.C.
(3d) 171 (N.S.C.A.); R. v. Kennedy, [1995] N.J. No. 340, 103 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (Nfld. C.A.); R. v.
Playford, [1987] O.J. No. 1107, 40 C.C.C. (3d) 142, at 158 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Young, [1987] N.B.J.
No. 826, 6 M.V.R. (2d) 295 (N.B.C.A.); R. v. Cairns, [2004] O.J. No. 210, 182 O.A.C. 181, at para.
10 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Panchyshyn, [1985] S.J. No. 411, 38 Sask. R. 239 (Sask. C.A.). Privacy must be
127
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consultation is possible at the place of initial detention (or anywhere a detainee is taken before a police station), it must be provided there.133 If not,
it must be provided at the station.134 Again, police may not elicit any evidence from the detainee before such access is provided.135
Once police provide private telephone access, they must give detainees
a “reasonable opportunity” to talk to a lawyer of their choosing.136 The
duration of this reasonable opportunity is uncertain, but in many cases it
may extend for several hours. It may turn on (among other things), the
availability of duty counsel,137 an urgent need to obtain evidence138 and
whether detainees were “diligent” in exercising their rights.139 Once again,
police may not question or obtain self-incriminating information from detainees until this reasonable opportunity has expired.140 Further, if a
provided even if the accused does not request it. See R. v. Jackson, [1983] O.J. No. 2511, 86 C.C.C.
(3d) 233 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Parrill, [1998] N.J. No. 322, 58 C.R.R. (2d) 56 (Nfld. C.A.); R. v. Butler,
[1995] B.C.J. No. 2716, 104 C.C.C. (3d) 198, at para. 45 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1996]
S.C.C.A. No. 90, 105 C.C.C. (3d) vi (S.C.C.); R. v. McKane, [1987] O.J. No. 557, 58 C.R. (3d) 130
(Ont. C.A.).
132
See R. v. Manninen, supra, note 105, at 1242 (“there may be circumstances in which it is
particularly urgent that the police continue with an investigation before it is possible to facilitate a
detainee’s communication with counsel”); R. v. Burley, [2004] O.J. No. 319, 181 C.C.C. (3d) 463, at
para. 16 (Ont. C.A.).
133
See R. v. Manninen, id., at 1242-43; R. v. Burley, id.
134
See R. v. Lewis, [2007] N.S.J. No. 18, 2007 NSCA 2 (N.S.C.A.) (public phone in railway
station did not provide sufficient privacy; police justified in transporting accused almost immediately
to police station to use telephone there).
135
R. v. Lewis, id., at para. 32.
136
See R. v. Ross, [1989] S.C.J. No. 2, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 3, at 11 (S.C.C.) (detainees only expected to have access to another lawyer, such as one provided by a duty counsel service, if chosen
lawyer “cannot be available within a reasonable time”).
137
See R. v. Prosper, supra, note 17, at 269-70 (“the existence of duty counsel services may
affect what constitutes ‘reasonable diligence’ of a detainee in pursuing the right to counsel, which
will in turn affect the length of the period during which the state authorities’ s. 10(b) implementational duties will require them to ‘hold off’ from trying to elicit incriminatory evidence from the
detainee”).
138
See R. v. Smith, [1989] S.C.J. No. 89, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 368, at 386-88 (S.C.C.); R. v. Prosper, id., at 270, 275 (“the fact that the evidence may cease to be available as a result of a long delay”
as well as the existence of “compelling and urgent circumstances” must be considered, however such
circumstances do not arise from “mere investigatory and evidentiary expediency”); R. v. Brydges,
supra, note 105, at 216; R. v. Basko, [2007] S.J. No. 564, 2007 SKCA 111, at para. 16 (Sask. C.A.).
139
R. v. Prosper, supra, note 17, at 269.
140
See R. v. Manninen, supra, note 105, at 1242; R. v. Prosper, supra, note 17, at 269. As a
rule, this bar does not apply to evidence that is not self-incriminating. Police are thus not obliged to
defer most types of searches until a reasonable opportunity to talk to a lawyer has been provided. See
R. v. Debot, supra, note 119, at 1146; R. v. Lewis, supra, note 134, at para. 34. But see R. v. Simmons, supra, note 17 (s. 10(b) rights violated when accused was subjected to a customs strip search;
had she been given the right to consult counsel, counsel could have informed her of her statutory
right to request higher authorization for the search); R. v. Debot, id. (where legality of search of a
detained individual contingent on consent, compliance with s. 10(b) condition precedent to a valid
search).
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detainee who wants to talk to a lawyer changes his or her mind before doing so, police must advise him or her of the right “to a reasonable
opportunity to contact counsel” and of the obligation on police during this
time frame “not to elicit incriminating evidence”.141
In many cases, complying with these requirements will dramatically
increase the duration and intrusiveness of an investigative detention. Indeed, when detainees invoke their right to counsel, it will frequently be
impossible to comply with section 10(b) within the “brief” period permitted by investigative detention. Despite the ubiquity of mobile phones and
24-hour duty counsel, the private consultation and “lawyer of choice”
requirements will necessitate prolonged detention on the street or at the
police station in a great many cases. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s
warning in Mann, applying section 10(b) would go a long way to transforming investigative detention into “de facto arrest”.142 Many people
would consequently be subjected to prolonged, custodial detention on the
basis of a standard (reasonable suspicion) that is markedly lower than the
grounds required for arrest (reasonable and probable grounds).143
A further cost of applying section 10(b) to investigative detention is
the loss of valuable investigative information. Some detainees who exercise their rights (and who would otherwise have cooperated with police)
will heed their lawyers’ advice to remain silent. As the purpose of investigative detention is to obtain preliminary information from people
reasonably suspected of committing criminal offences, and as such information will often justify the use of further investigative tools (such as
arrest, searches incident to arrest and the obtaining of search warrants),
the loss of this information is no small matter.
As mentioned, the Court’s response to these difficulties was to note
in Suberu that its definition of detention “gives the police leeway to engage members of the public in non-coercive, exploratory questioning
without necessarily triggering their Charter rights”.144 However, as we
have argued, the very flexibility of this definition permits police to impose considerable restraints on individual liberty.
Further, even if we concede (for the sake of argument) that Grant
demarcates the optimal line between coercive and non-coercive restraint
for the category of non-legal psychological detention, there is still the
matter of detention by physical restraint. There is little jurisprudence on
141
142
143
144

R. v. Prosper, supra, note 17, at 274.
Mann, supra, note 7, at para. 35.
See Penney, “Triggering the Right”, supra, note 67, at 289.
Suberu, supra, note 2, at para. 45.
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the meaning of this category of detention, likely because it is usually obvious. Though no court has ventured to define it, it appears to encompass
situations where police take physical control over suspects by handling
them in a manner that is more than fleeting or trifling.145 So, for example,
if police grasp an individual’s arms,146 use handcuffs147 or direct a suspect into the back seat of a police cruiser,148 a physical detention
obviously results. Detention similarly ensues from searching suspects’
bodies or clothing, or searching their personal belongings while in their
presence.149 In any of these circumstances, an analysis as to whether
there was a psychological detention is unnecessary. Once a police officer
takes physical control of a suspect, no reasonable person could possibly
conclude that he or she is still free to walk away.150
It is therefore clear that if police conduct a protective pat-down search,
they have triggered a detention and must comply with section 10(b) of the
Charter. The same occurs any time police touch a suspect151 in a nontrivial way.152 We take no issue with the need for police to have reasonable
suspicion and otherwise comply with the requirements for lawful investi145
As mentioned, in Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 42, the Court noted that a fleeting touch is
probably not enough to result in a non-legal psychological detention. Any physical contact that is
more sustained or significant, however, should undoubtedly be characterized as a physical detention.
See, e.g., R. v. Debot, supra, note 119, at 1152, 1161 (suspect ordered to stand “spread eagle”
against a wall and empty his pockets was detained); R. v. Feeney, supra, note 17, at para. 56
(accused detained when police shook his leg and told him to get out of bed).
146
See, e.g., R. v. Hanano, [2007] M.J. No. 11, 2007 MBQB 9, at para. 6 (Man. Q.B.).
147
See, e.g., R. v. Greaves, supra, note 115, at para. 18.
148
See, e.g., R. v. Elshaw, supra, note 27; R. v. Lawrence, supra, note 30.
149
See R. v. Greffe, [1990] S.C.J. No. 32, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 755, at 793-94 (S.C.C.); R. v. Simmons, supra, note 17, at 521; R. v. V. (T.A.), supra, note 94, at para. 21 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Rube,
[1992] B.C.J. No. 105, 10 B.C.A.C. 48 (B.C.C.A.).
150
See R. v. Feeney, supra, note 17, at para. 56 (accused detained when police shook his leg
and told him to get out of bed).
151
As noted above, in Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 36, the Court stated that no detention
arises when police “interfere with a person’s freedom of movement” in the context of a “nonadversarial role and assisting members of the public in circumstances commonly accepted as lacking
the essential character of a detention”.
152
Unfortunately, the case law provides little direction as to the sort of force that police are
permitted to use incidental to an investigative detention. On more than a few occasions, the courts
have noted (uncritically) that police used physical force to restrain an uncooperative detainee. See R.
v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725, at paras. 10-12 (S.C.C.); R. v. Duong, supra,
note 115, at paras. 30-32; R. v. Greaves, supra, note 115, at paras. 18, 55, 59. Provided that police
use only as much force as “necessary,” s. 25(1) of the Criminal Code would provide a justification
for police in such circumstances. For example, in a pre-Mann case, the Ontario Court of Appeal held
that if a suspect does not “submit to lawful detention”, then the officer is entitled to “pursue him”
and, when caught, to “physically restrain” him: R. v. Wainwright, [1999] O.J. No. 3539, 68 C.R.R.
(2d) 29, at 30 (Ont. C.A.). Courts have also approved the use of handcuffs during investigative detentions for reasonable safety reasons. See R. v. O. (N.), [2009] A.J. No. 213, 2 Alta. L.R. (5th) 72, at
paras. 9-10, 45 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Greaves, id., at paras. 55, 59; Duong, id., at paras. 28, 57.
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gative detention before intruding on suspects’ bodily integrity in these
ways. Requiring them to comply with section 10(b) of the Charter in all
such cases, however, would be unwise. Consider a police officer who has
reasonable suspicion (but not reasonable and probable grounds) that a pedestrian has committed an offence. Assume as well that the officer
reasonably believes that the suspect might be carrying a weapon. The officer has three choices: (i) approach the suspect to make preliminary
inquiries without triggering a detention; (ii) effect an investigative detention; or (iii) leave the suspect alone. Under option (i), the officer would not
be permitted to conduct a protective pat-down search, thereby risking the
officer’s own (and perhaps others’) safety. Under option (ii), the officer
would be forced to comply with section 10(b), thereby risking losing valuable evidence and prolonging a potentially innocent person’s detention.
And under option (iii), an opportunity to obtain evidence of a potential
crime and apprehend its perpetrator would be lost.
These and all the other costs of applying section 10(b) of the Charter
to investigative detention that we have discussed might be worth incurring if they were outweighed by the benefits. In Suberu, the Court
outlined its concerns about suspending the right to counsel for investigative detention as follows:
A situation of vulnerability relative to the state is created at the outset
of a detention. Thus, the concerns about self-incrimination and the
interference with liberty that s. 10(b) seeks to address are present as
soon as a detention is effected. In order to protect against the risk of
self-incrimination that result from the individuals being deprived of
their liberty by the state, and in order to assist them in regaining their
liberty, it is only logical that the phrase “without delay” must be
interpreted as “immediately”. If the s. 10(b) right to counsel is to serve
its intended purpose to mitigate the legal disadvantage and legal
jeopardy faced by detainees, and to assist them in regaining their
liberty, the police must immediately inform them of the right to counsel
153
as soon as the detention arises.

This argument is not convincing. The Court itself has recognized in
many analogous situations that brief detentions accompanied by nonaccusatory questioning do not imperil the interests protected by section
10(b) of the Charter. It has held that police need not comply with section 10(b) in exercising powers to briefly detain motorists to investigate
driving-related offences. In Thomsen, it concluded that the right to
153

Suberu, supra, note 2, at para. 41.
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counsel may be denied to drivers subject to breath alcohol screening
demands.154 It has similarly upheld the denial of the right to counsel to
drivers questioned about their alcohol consumption or asked to perform
physical sobriety tests.155 Courts of appeal have also exempted police
from cautioning drivers156 and passengers157 subject to brief, lawful,
roadside detentions for general vehicle offence investigations. Similarly, the Court has held that customs officials need not comply with
section 10(b) when conducting brief, preliminary questioning of people
entering and leaving Canada.158
The rationale behind these exemptions from section 10(b) is simple: complying with section 10(b) in these circumstances would often
needlessly prolong an individual’s detention and also frustrate investi154
Thomsen, supra, note 17, at 650-56. Section 254(2) of the Criminal Code permits police,
on the basis of reasonable suspicion, to demand that a motorist provide a sample of breath for analysis by an “approved screening device” (“ASD”). To be legally effective and constitutionally sound,
this demand must generally be made immediately, i.e., before there is a reasonable opportunity to
contact counsel. A positive result does not prove liability, but will typically give police the reasonable and probable grounds they require to demand a breathalyzer sample, which precisely determines
the alcohol concentration in a person’s blood. See Criminal Code, s. 254(3); R. v. Woods, [2005]
S.C.J. No. 42, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 205, at paras. 13-15, 30-32, 43-44 (S.C.C.); R. v. Latour, [1997] O.J.
No. 2445, 116 C.C.C. (3d) 279 (Ont. C.A.).
155
R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 54-60
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Orbanski & Elias”]. See also Berkemer v. McCarty, supra, note 92 (Miranda
does not apply to motorists subject to brief roadside questioning as such questioning does not constitute “custodial interrogation”). At the time the offences were committed in Orbanksi; Elias, police
did not have the power to compel motorists to answer questions or perform sobriety tests. They must
have therefore sought motorists’ voluntary cooperation. However, they could randomly stop motorists to investigate driving offences (which is a form of legal psychological detention) and in the
course of such an investigation ask motorists to voluntarily answer questions or voluntarily perform
sobriety tests. See R. v. Hufsky, supra, note 20; R. v. Ladouceur, supra, note 20. The Criminal Code
has since been amended to empower police to demand that motorists perform roadside physical
coordination tests based on reasonable suspicion. Criminal Code, s. 254(2)(a).
156
R. v. MacLennan, [1995] N.S.J. No. 77, 138 N.S.R. (2d) 369, at para. 61 (N.S.C.A.)
(driver is not entitled to right to counsel during period between detention and conclusion of the inspection of documents, which must be as brief as possible); R. v. Campbell, supra, note 8, at para. 49
(no violation when police obtained driver’s licence during roadside detention without first advising
driver of right to counsel).
157
R. v. Harris, [2007] O.J. No. 3185, 87 O.R. (3d) 214, at paras. 45-49 (Ont. C.A.); R. v.
Bradley, [2008] N.S.J. No. 268, 266 N.S.R. (2d) 126, at para. 16 (N.S.C.A.) (vehicle passengers not
automatically detained when vehicle pulled over by police).
158
See R. v. Simmons, supra, note 17; R. v. Jacoy, [1988] S.C.J. No. 83, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 548
(S.C.C.); Dehghani v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), supra, note 17 (detention
not arising from secondary examination). See also R. v. Sekhon, [2009] B.C.J. No. 855, 2009 BCCA
187, at paras. 69-77 (B.C.C.A.) (no detention arising from routine questioning and routine search of
vehicle); R. v. Hardy, [1995] B.C.J. No. 2570, 103 C.C.C. (3d) 289, at paras. 28-52 (B.C.C.A.) (detention not arising from secondary examination or destructive luggage search). See also R. v.
Vandenbosch, [2007] M.J. No. 346, 2007 MBCA 113 (Man. C.A.) (applying customs detention
jurisprudence to prison visitors).

472

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)

gations159 while doing little to advance the objectives of the right. In the
case of roadside screening demands, so long as police follow the rules,
suspects must either comply or risk criminal punishment for refusal.160
In the vast majority of cases, talking to a lawyer would not change this
situation.
More importantly, affording a right to counsel at this point would do
little to deter abusive interrogation practices. Brief roadside stops are not
likely to involve coercive interrogation methods or generate false confessions. As the United States Supreme Court has observed, the brevity and
public nature of most traffic stops substantially mitigates the risk of this
kind of abuse.161 The same logic applies to preliminary customs and immigration questioning. There is little to be gained (and much to be lost)
in providing the right to counsel to people subject to routine questioning
at border crossings.
So it is for investigative detention. As long as such detentions remain
limited to their intended scope (brief questioning to quickly confirm or
refute the reasonably based suspicion that led to the stop), there is no
need for section 10(b)’s protections. Imposing the right to counsel in
these circumstances would instead increase the duration and intrusiveness of detentions, compromise police and public safety, and deprive
police of valuable preliminary investigative information. Further, in an
effort to avoid these consequences, courts will be strongly tempted (as
the Supreme Court was in Suberu) to avoid finding that a detention has
arisen despite a substantial intrusion on a person’s liberty.
4. Reform
If we are correct that the best policy is to exempt investigative detention from section 10(b), the question becomes how to apply it in a manner
consistent with the Charter. We agree with the Supreme Court in Suberu
that the approach taken in the court below was ill-advised. Not only did it
require a strained reading of “without delay”,162 but the uncertain duration
of the “brief interlude” contemplated by the Court of Appeal would cause
159
Thomsen, supra, note 17, at 650-56 (noting that conferring a right to counsel at this stage
would unduly diminish the deterrence of impaired driving). See also R. v. Grant, [1991] S.C.J. No.
78, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 139 (S.C.C.).
160
See Criminal Code, s. 254(5).
161
Berkemer v. McCarty, supra, note 92, at 438-39.
162
See Suberu, supra, note 2, at para. 47, Binnie J., dissenting (noting that the Court of Appeal’s proposal “sits uncomfortably with the constitutional text”).
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many police officers to issue the caution prematurely, thereby prolonging
the detention of the innocent (on the minimal standard of reasonable suspicion) and make it more difficult to obtain reliable, incriminating evidence
from the guilty.163 In other cases, police would wait too long, depriving
suspects of their rights in precisely the circumstances when they are most
needed to protect against inquisitorial overreaching.
The better solution is to justify a brief override of section 10(b)
under section 1 of the Charter. This is the approach that the Supreme
Court has taken for roadside investigations relating to motor vehicle
safety. In each of these cases, the courts have found that the claimant was
detained but that the failure to comply with section 10(b) was justified
under section 1 of the Charter.164 The Court did not take this approach in
the customs and immigration cases. Despite the fact that failure to cooperate in these circumstances is an offence,165 the Court found that people
stopped for routine questioning and searches at border crossings are not
detained for Charter purposes.166 This approach is plainly inconsistent
with the Therens/Grant definition of psychological detention with legal
compulsion.167 The same result could have more sensibly been achieved,
however, by applying section 1 of the Charter.
Justifying non-compliance with section 10(b) for investigative detention will help ensure that questioning remains brief and preliminary and
thus limit the tendency of courts to increasingly expand the boundaries of

163

Penney, “Triggering the Right”, supra, note 67, at 288-89.
See Thomsen, supra, note 17, at 650-56; Orbanski; Elias, supra, note 155, at paras. 5460. See also R. v. Woods, supra, note 154, at paras. 13-15, 30-32, 43-44; R. v. Latour, supra, note
154; R. v. Smith, [1996] O.J. No. 372, 105 C.C.C. (3d) 58 (Ont. C.A.) (denial of right to counsel at
roadside stop for brief period for purposes of questioning motorist about alcohol consumption and
performing physical sobriety test is reasonable limit justified under s. 1); R. v. Sadlon, [1992] O.J.
No. 912, 36 M.V.R. (2d) 127 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1992] S.C.C.A. No. 191, [1992] 3
S.C.R. viii (S.C.C.) (availability of a telephone is irrelevant in finding that denial of right to counsel
in roadside detention for purposes of breath demand is reasonable limit justified by s. 1); R. v. Saunders, [1988] O.J. No. 397, 41 C.C.C. (3d) 532 (Ont. C.A.) (justification under s. 1 for denial of right
to counsel prior to breath demand also applies to statutory provision authorizing demand for coordination testing).
165
See Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.), s. 153.1; Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 127, 128. See Customs Act, ss. 98, 99.1, 99.2, 99.3; Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, s. 16.
166
See R. v. Simmons, supra, note 17; R. v. Jacoy, supra, note 158; Dehghani v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), supra, note 17. See also R. v. Sekhon, supra, note 158,
at paras. 69-77; R. v. Hardy, supra, note 158, at paras. 28-52.
167
See generally Eric Colvin & Tim Quigley, “Developments in Criminal Law and Procedure:
The 1988-89 Term” (1990) 1 S.C.L.R. 187, at 224-25; Quigley, supra, note 100, § 5.3(c)(i).
164
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the common law power.168 As in the contexts of vehicle stops169 and border crossings,170 police seeking to investigate further would have to issue
the caution immediately. Further, because such questioning by definition
exceeds the scope of the investigative detention power, police would either have to make an arrest or make it absolutely clear that the suspect is
free to leave.
What precisely do we mean by “brief” and “preliminary”? Courts
have been reluctant to impose a quantitative limit on the length of investigative detentions,171 and we do not propose one here. However, absent
exceptional circumstances, a detention lasting longer than 20 minutes
would seem to be excessive.172 The scope of investigative detention
would also be exceeded by questioning that is the functional equivalent
of an interrogation. As under the Moran approach to detention discussed
above, an investigative detention (and the accompanying suspension of
the right to counsel) would expire when police decide that the individual
probably committed an offence and ask questions designed to induce
self-incriminating answers. These are precisely the circumstances when
suspects need the protection of the right to counsel.173
To summarize, under Mann police may detain for investigative purposes when they reasonably suspect that a person has recently committed
(or is still committing) a criminal offence.174 Investigative detention can
be triggered by either physical or (non-legal) psychological detention.
Under our proposal, in the latter case detention arises from constraints on
168
See James Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment? Investigative Detention: Ten Years
Later” (2003) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 335, at 373-76 [hereinafter “Stribopoulos, ‘A Failed Experiment?’”]
(noting the lack of guidance that courts have provided in defining the maximum duration of investigative detentions).
169
Therens, supra, note 10. See also Orbanski; Elias, supra, note 155, at para. 57 (“there is
no question that the motorist who is not allowed to continue on his way but, rather, is requested to
provide a breath or blood sample, is entitled to the full protection of the Charter right to counsel”).
See also R. v. Woods, supra, note 154, at paras. 35-36.
170
See, R. v. Simmons, supra, note 17, at 521 (detention arose when suspect strip-searched);
R. v. Jacoy, supra, note 158, at 557-58 (detention arose when decision made to strip-search suspect
if necessary).
171
See, e.g., R. v. Greaves, supra, note 115, at paras. 50-55 (40-minute detention lawful as
accused’s evasive and inconsistent responses regarding his identity gave rise to reasonable grounds
to suspect him of attempting to obstruct justice). See also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, at
709, n. 10 (1983) (a time limit would interfere with the ability of the “authorities to graduate their
responses to the demands of any particular situation”).
172
In its Model Code the Institute adopts a 20-minute rule. See American Law Institute, A
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1975), at 283
[hereinafter “Model Code”].
173
See Penney, “What’s Wrong?, supra, note 100, at 321.
174
Mann, supra, note 7, at paras. 34, 45.
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liberty and is decided with reference only to the first variable of the test
we proposed above (“the language used to initiate the encounter”). Police
effecting such detentions need not comply with section 10(b) of the
Charter. In contrast, police triggering a detention by means of the second
variable (“the nature of any ensuing questioning”) exceeds the scope of
investigative detention and must therefore comply with section 10(b) of
the Charter. Police wishing to interrogate likely perpetrators without issuing the Charter caution must therefore make it clear that they are not
being detained and are free to leave.
Ideally, this proposal would be effected by legislation upheld by the
courts under section 1 of the Charter.175 If the courts apply Grant in the
way that we have proposed, police may become legitimately frustrated
with their obligation under the current law to comply with section 10(b)
during investigative detention and lobby Parliament for a statutory response.
What is at least as likely, however, is that courts will strain to avoid
finding detention, permitting police to substantially curtail suspects’ liberty without reasonable suspicion. In this scenario, Parliament may
conclude (as it often does) that there is little to be gained from legislative
intervention.176
Though in principle a second-best solution, the most realistic one
may thus be for the Supreme Court to reconsider Suberu and uphold under section 1 the denial of the right to counsel during lawful common law
investigative detentions.177 Indeed, as long as the courts are prepared to
recognize new common law police powers, some may inevitably have to
be justified under section 1 of the Charter. The Supreme Court has held
that common law rules are “prescribed by law” within the meaning of
that provision.178 It has also upheld Charter-limiting common law rules

175

See Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment?”, supra, note 167, at 376-78, suggesting that an
override of the right to counsel incidental to investigative detention could be upheld as a reasonable
limit under s. 1 of the Charter but arguing that the overriding of constitutional rights is something
that should come from Parliament and not the courts. For a model legislative response, see, Model
Code, supra, note 172, § 110.2(1).
176
See generally James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police
Powers and the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1.
177
Penney, “Triggering the Right”, supra, note 67, at 289-90. The Court in Suberu, supra,
note 2, at para. 45, may have planted the seed for such a reappraisal in noting that it was “not persuaded, on this appeal, that a case has been made out for a general suspension of the s. 10(b) right to
counsel for investigatory purposes ...” (emphasis added).
178
Therens, supra, note 10, at 645.
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(including newly recognized ones) in many other contexts.179 And unlike
in any of these cases, justifying the limitation of section 10(b) for investigative detention would benefit both the state and the individual. Police
would find it easier to obtain preliminary investigative information from
persons reasonably suspected of criminal activity, and such persons (if
not arrested) would on average spend less time in custody. Of course,
applying section 10(b) to investigative detention would benefit factually
guilty suspects who exercised their rights and remained silent as a consequence of talking to a lawyer. But given the limited, inherently noncoercive nature of the questioning permitted for investigative detentions,
this loss of protection against self-incrimination is not worthy of consideration under section 1 of the Charter.180

IV. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the Court’s judgment in Grant on the meaning of nonlegal psychological detention seems to be written exclusively for one
audience: lower courts. A second, and equally important, audience (the
police) is ignored, encouraging a troubling division between law in the
courtroom and law on the streets. For those most likely to be victims of
179

See British Columbia Government Employees’ Union v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 76, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214 (S.C.C.) (upholding common law of criminal
contempt); R. v. Daviault, [1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.) (upholding judicially
created reverse onus for defence of extreme intoxication); R. v. Stone, [1999] S.C.J. No. 27, [1999] 2
S.C.R. 290 (S.C.C.) (upholding judicially created reverse onus for automatism defence).
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The Supreme Court suggested in Orbanski; Elias, supra, note 155, at paras. 58-59, that,
as a result of concerns over compelled self-incrimination, the violation of s. 10(b) during roadside
detentions might not be justified if the Crown attempted to prove impairment by adducing evidence
created by the accused such as the results of alcohol screening tests and answers to questions about
consumption. See also R. v. Milne, [1996] O.J. No. 1728, 107 C.C.C. (3d) 118, at 121 (Ont. C.A.); R.
v. Coutts, [1999] O.J. No. 2013, 136 C.C.C. (3d) 225, at paras. 15-18 (Ont. C.A.). Similarly,
Suberu’s counsel argued on appeal that a s. 1 exemption for investigative detention would only be
warranted if “any incriminating evidence gathered prior to informing an individual of his or her s.
10(b) right to counsel is inadmissible against him or her”: Suberu, supra, note 2, at para. 44.
This position is curious. If evidence created by drivers during roadside detentions is admissible
for the purpose of demonstrating the existence of reasonable and probable grounds (which it is), and
such grounds provide the basis for breathalyzer demands (the results of which are admissible), then
this evidence must be “self-incriminating” in any realistic sense of the phrase. It is thus difficult to
understand why evidence collected from drivers during roadside detentions should not be admissible
to prove impairment or, putting the same point slightly differently, why s. 1 of the Charter justifies
denying the right to counsel when such evidence is admitted to establish grounds for the breathalyzer
demand on the voir dire but not when it is admitted to prove impairment at trial. Similarly, immunizing self-incriminating statements made before the right to counsel is afforded would greatly frustrate
the purpose of investigative detention. If such statements, or if any further information “derived”
from them, were not admissible, police would have little reason to use the power.
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unjustified police stops, this division can only worsen existing cynicism
toward the law, the police and the criminal justice system.181 If the purpose of section 9 of the Charter is to protect people from unjustified state
interference, the constitutional safeguard must meaningfully regulate the
countless daily interactions between police and members of the public.
The starting point for such an endeavour must be clear guidance for the
police. We hope that in years to come Canadian courts will interpret and
apply Grant to provide just that.
We also hope that Parliament and the Supreme Court, ideally working in constructive dialogue, revisit the application of section 10(b) of the
Charter to investigative detention. It is a rare occasion indeed when the
interests of the individual and state coincide in constitutional criminal
procedure. This is one of them. Justifying non-compliance with section
10(b) as a reasonable limit under section 1 of the Charter would help police obtain valuable evidence of crime, protect innocent suspects from
lengthy and intrusive detention, and prompt courts to confine the investigative detention power to its proper, limited scope.

181
See Janet E. Mosher, “Lessons in Access to Justice: Racialized Youths and Ontario’s
Safe Schools” (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 807, at 812. In reporting on the results of a study involving Black youth living in the Jane-Finch area of Toronto, Mosher explained that:
… for the youths, law was regarded as inextricably connected to power, and thus to the
powerful. In their accounts, the law is simply what the powerful authority figures in their
lives — the police officers … — command at any given moment. This lesson regarding
law and power is repeated for them over and over again in their interactions with …
criminal justice personnel. The law is not something that generates entitlements or protections; rather, it is invoked by those with power against those without. The youths
describe a reality in which there is no rule of law — a reality in which the law does not
operate to check state power or apply equally to all. Predictably, these experiences and
understandings of the way law works lead to a deep scepticism regarding the ability of
the legal system to dispense justice.
See also Hon. Roy McMurtry & Alvin Curling, Roots of Youth Violence, vol. 1 (Toronto:
Queen’s Printer, 2008), at 77-79, cautioning that “if police stops or interventions are done discriminatorily or aggressively in a degrading manner … a deep sense of grievance and frustration can
result … [Y]outh must be treated with respect and dignity; they cannot be expected to respect a
system that does not respect them.”

